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A B S T R A C T. It is commonly asserted that innovation markets suffer from excessive
intellectual property protections, which in turn stifle output. But empirical inquiries can neither
confirm nor deny this assertion. Under the agnostic assumption that we cannot assess directly
whether intellectual property coverage is excessive, an alternative query is proposed: can the
market assess if any "propertization outcome" is excessive and then undertake actions to correct
it? This process-based approach takes the view that innovator populations make rent-seeking
investments that continuously select among innovation regimes that trade off securing
innovation gains (which tends to demand more property) against reducing transaction costs and
associated innovation losses (which tends to demand less). If we can identify the conditions
under which privately interested investments in lobbying, enforcement, and transactional
arrangements are likely to yield socially interested propertization outcomes, then the underlying
datum at issue- whether there is "too much" intellectual property -can be determined indirectly
at some reasonable degree of approximation. This approach identifies a "property trap" effect
where, under high coordination costs, the regime selection mechanism is prone to fail: litigation
risk and associated transaction cost burdens drive innovators to overconsume state-provided
property rights. Conversely, under low coordination costs, the regime selection mechanism is
prone to succeed: adversely affected entities that rely substantially on outside sources for
innovation inputs have incentives to undertake actions that weaken property-rights coverage,
including constrained enforcement, forming cooperative arrangements, or even forfeiting
intellectual property to the public domain. Counterintuitively, these relationships imply that
large firms that rely substantially on outside sources for innovation inputs tend to have the
strongest incentives and capacities to take actions that correct overpropertization outcomes.
Preliminary evidence is drawn from the semiconductor, financial services, and information
technology industries.
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INTRODUCTION
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to
recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a
long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.'
In 1958, in the midst of public debate over the patent system, economist
Fritz Machlup delivered the above "non-opinion" to a Senate subcommittee,
disclaiming any definitive knowledge concerning whether or not the patent
system is a socially desirable institution. Just over fifty years later, a similar
public debate over the intellectual property system proceeds in the Supreme
Court, which has taken a renewed interest in patent jurisprudence; Congress,
which has been deliberating substantial reforms to the patent statutes; and
other policymaking, judicial, and scholarly venues. While we certainly have a
considerably improved theoretical and empirical understanding on localized
points of interest, it is probably uncontroversial among most economically
informed observers that Machlup's qualified statement still characterizes our
current understanding of the net social value of the intellectual property system
as a general matter Despite this indeterminacy, contemporary legal and
1. FRITZ MACHLUP, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 8o (Comm.
Print 1958) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REVIEW]. Several years later, Fritz Machlup, the author
of the subcommittee study, expressed a similar remark: "The absence of any empirical
evidence for either the claim or its denial that the patent system is an effective promoter of
inventive research . . . is most frustrating." FRITZ MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED STATES 176 (1962).
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1O (2003) (noting "the degree to which economic analysis of
intellectual property remains inconclusive, if not indeterminate"); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Who Decides the Extent of Rights in Intellectual Property?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 405, 405-06
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman & Harry First eds., 2001) (stating
that "we know so little about the effects of our current intellectual property regime on the
production and use of traditional intellectual property that it is silly to suppose that we have
the information essential to prescribe new regimes for new kinds of intellectual property"
and that "[t ]he best academic students of the subject disclaim knowledge" as to the optimal
strength of intellectual property protection); Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in
Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29 REs. POL'Y 531, 531 (2000) (stating
that "robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovation
of changes in patent policy are few"); Julia D. Mahoney, Lawrence Lessig's Dystopian Vision,
9o VA. L. REv. 2305, 2332-33 (2004) (book review) (noting that "it is impossible to state with
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scholarly commentary widely asserts that intellectual property coverage has
expanded excessively, especially in recently propertized markets that lie at the
heart of a knowledge-based economy: business and financial methods,
software, semiconductors, and biotechnology.' This often-dramatic
commentary-which I refer to globally as the "too much property" thesis-
warns that a formerly unfettered exchange of ideas has been stifled by a thicket
of intellectual property that on the whole impedes, rather than facilitates,
technological progress or artistic creativity. But empirics have yet to track
rhetoric: the too much property thesis has yet to be supported or denied by
definitive evidence4 and, more generally, stands in uncomfortable contrast with
the continuing innovative vigor of the markets where intellectual property
thickets are usually claimed to be most intense.
In this Article, I take this empirical uncertainty as an analytical given. I start
from the agnostic assumption that we do not have sufficiently reliable
information or sufficiently sensitive tools to ascertain whether there is excessive
intellectual property protection in any innovation market' at any given time.
Contrary to the normative mode of most intellectual property scholarship, I
therefore maintain strict neutrality throughout as to the socially desirable level
of effective property rights coverage-what I call the "propertization
outcome"-in any field of technological or cultural innovation. Explicit and
consistent recognition of our limited knowledge opens the door to an
alternative line of inquiry. In place of the "substance" question as to whether or
not any given propertization outcome is excessive, I ask a "process" question:
can the market assess if any propertization outcome is excessive and then
undertake actions to move toward a socially preferable alternative outcome?
Even if we cannot reliably assess whether or not intellectual property coverage
in any given market is excessive, it may be possible to arrive at a reasonable
approximation of this unknown datum indirectly by assessing whether the
conditions under which coverage is effectively determined are likely to yield
and tolerate excessive propertization levels. This approximates standard
complete confidence that any [intellectual property] regime strikes .. .the ideal balance"
between incentives and access).
3. For references, see infra notes 59-60.
4. For more detailed discussion and supporting references, see infra note 103.
5. By "innovation market," I mean any market for the distribution of cultural, technological, or
other ideational assets. For the most part, empirical support for my thesis is drawn from
markets for technology that are covered by patent rights (as well as database markets that
are subject to minimal forms of copyright protection and certain semiconductor products
that are covered by sui generis forms of protection). However, my thesis is formulated
generically and is logically applicable to cultural markets that are covered by copyright. For
further discussion, see infra note 131.
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methodology in antitrust law, where regulators, courts, and scholars indirectly
assess claims of anticompetitive conduct by assessing whether conditions exist
that would tolerate and preserve inefficient pricing, rather than assessing
whether existing pricing is inefficient.6 So too intellectual property scholars
may be able to indirectly assess claims of overpropertization by assessing
whether conditions exist that would tolerate and preserve overpropertization
outcomes, rather than assessing whether existing propertization outcomes are
excessive.
To put this process-based approach into operation, I adopt three
foundational assumptions. First, I assume that more or less propertization
always involves a tradeoff between innovation gains (which require "more IP")
and transaction cost losses, including all related social losses in the form of
frustrated subsequent innovation (which require "less IP")7 This implies a
simple social cost-benefit test for any propertization outcome: it must yield
innovation gains in excess of transaction cost losses. Otherwise, it is excessive
consistent with the various formulations of the too much property thesis.
Second, in lieu of the top-down approach inherent to legal scholarship where
formal actions by the state determine the extant level of intellectual property
coverage, I adopt the bottom-up approach of the new institutional economics
literature,8 where private-market investments are the primary factor in eliciting
formal issuance of property entitlements. These investments then determine
the effective strength of any issued entitlements through adoption and
enforcement actions as well as a wide range of transactional arrangements for
6. This approach drives modern economically informed antitrust analysis. For a well-known
account, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
116-33 (The Free Press 1993) (1978). Note that this "alternative" approach is the standard
approach in conventional nicroeconomic analysis, which generally seeks to demonstrate
how competitive markets produce efficient outcomes, in contrast to most law and economics
analyses, which generally seek to address whether particular legal rules or doctrines are
efficient. See Paul H. Rubin, Judge-Made Law, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS:
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 543, 544-45 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De
Geest eds., 2000).
7. This standard does not exhaustively account for the complex bundle of social gains and
losses generated by any extension of intellectual property coverage. However, it is a
reasonably close translation of various formulations of the idea that intellectual property
coverage is "excessive" and supplies a workable standard by which to isolate the market's
ability and incentives to implement propertization outcomes in conformity with the social
interest (understood in this limited but meaningful manner). For a precise definition of
.transaction cost losses," including subsequent innovation losses, see infra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text. To avoid any broader efficiency implications, I endeavor throughout to
describe "correct" propertization outcomes as "socially compatible," "socially preferred,"
"socially desirable," or "socially interested." For further discussion, see infra note 49.
8. For bibliographic references to this large literature, see infra notes 49-50.
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exchanging and distributing those entitlements. This methodological turn
critically reframes entitlement strength as a moving variable linked to dollar
investments by entitlement holders: that is, the strength of any intellectual
property entitlement is a continuous function of its formal content plus the
expenditures made to fund the costly actions required to implement it. Third, I
suppose that these market expenditures then select propertization outcomes
that can be situated along a graduated path of innovation regimes, which is
bounded by the conventional alternatives of property and commons but
comprises in its intermediate region a rich variety of limited-access property
regimes-what I refer to globally as "sharing regimes"-where some, but not
all, relevant innovation assets are eligible for property rights protection.
This analytical framework supports this Article's primary exercise: to
identify the conditions under which privately interested innovator populations
likely will, and will not, have the incentives and capacities to undertake
lobbying, adoption, enforcement, and other actions that select socially
interested points along the regime path, each of which implements some
tradeoff between innovation gains and transaction cost losses. Put slightly
differently: is the market likely to make a mistake as it selects among
innovation regimes and, if so, can we anticipate the direction of any such
mistake? To formulate a meaningful response, I focus on stylized movements
between two broadly defined regions on the regime path: (i) a property regime
where innovation assets are substantially protected by property rights and (ii) a
sharing regime where innovation assets are substantially unprotected by
property rights. This theoretical exercise yields a property trap scenario where
the market is inherently likely to get it wrong. The underlying mechanism is
straightforward: as a result of negative externalities generated by innovators
who exit a sharing regime for a newly introduced property regime, an
innovation market is prone to move "too quickly" in abandoning the low
transaction cost structure of a sharing regime, resulting in a net social loss
consistent with the too much property thesis. Faced with increasing litigation
risk from potential infringement claims and increasing input costs from a
declining innovation pool, each innovator rationally defects to the property
regime even if it would elect otherwise if sufficient coordination could be
achieved to control outward migration. This property trap thesis supplies an
economic rationale for the widely expressed intuition that there seems to be too
much intellectual property. But there is a key difference: the property trap
thesis identifies the predicate conditions under which the market is likely to
tolerate an excessive propertization outcome and does not directly take any view
as to whether propertization levels in any particular market are excessive.
Where those conditions are not satisfied, there is a substantially reduced
likelihood that excessive intellectual property coverage would be tolerated by
the relevant market, in which case, at some reasonable level of certainty, we can
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
indirectly take the view that existing propertization outcomes are either not
excessive or, if excessive, are likely to be cured by market action within some
reasonable period of time.
Building in part on established lessons from the public choice literature on
the rationally self-interested processes that drive policy outcomes,9 I argue that
markets are likely to resist and correct overpropertization- that is, the property
trap is likely to be broken-where two conditions are substantially satisfied.
First, it must be the case that adversely affected innovators are neither clearly
net users nor clearly net producers of the relevant pool of intellectual goods,
which is likely to be true in any market that relies on cumulative innovation-
that is, a sequence of related first-mover and n-mover innovations-and
thereby compels even highly integrated entities to access inputs from outside
sources. Firms that tend to stand on both sides of intellectual property
transactions- that is, tend to both purchase and sell intellectual goods to a
meaningful extent-have a rational interest in an intermediate level of
protection that both secures returns on the sale of intellectual outputs and
reduces the costs incurred to obtain intellectual inputs in the course of product
development. Second, it must be the case that adversely affected innovators
enjoy low coordination costs, which is likely to be true where innovators are
few in number (or act through a collective organization) and occupy a
dominant market position. In small-number blocs that occupy a large portion
of the relevant market, each individual firm may expect to derive a sufficient
portion of the joint gains generated by collectively beneficial restraints on the
adoption and enforcement of intellectual property protections, thereby
alleviating the free-rider problem that otherwise results in- collective action
failure.
These limited but potent capacities for market self-correction yield an
important implication that challenges the conventional political economy of
intellectual property: concentrated and well-endowed economic interests-
normally, the chief alleged culprits behind excessive levels of intellectual
property protection -are often most likely to have the strongest incentives and
capacities to scale back overextended intellectual property coverage.
This proposition -which runs counter to widely held popular and scholarly
views as to the political process by which intellectual property rights are
typically determined-is far from a theoretical artifact. Ample empirical
evidence illustrates robust self-correction capacities among large-firm
incumbents, precisely in economically critical innovation markets that both
9. The literature is vast. For a seminal source, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). For a standard current
reference, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003).
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stand at the heart of our knowledge economy and are presumptively most
susceptible to, and widely believed to suffer from, excessive propertization.'0 I
identify a wide range of "truncation actions" in the information technology,
software, database, financial services, and biotechnology markets, where,
contrary to oft-mentioned claims (and theoretical expectations) of runaway
transaction costs and suppressed innovative output, incumbent firms have
substantially halted or curtailed movements toward enhanced propertization.
These actions cover a broad range of activities, including direct influence
through lobbying actions or, of greater practical interest, indirect influence
through constrained enforcement, patent pools, research consortia, public
access databases, and other voluntarily formed sharing arrangements that
substantially lower the transaction cost burdens and innovation losses
associated with a robust property regime. Most dramatically, these truncation
actions include outright forfeitures of intellectual assets to the public domain.
Far from being the inveterate enemies of the social interest, the most influential
holders of intellectual resources often self-interestedly act in substantial
conformity with the collective interest in scaling back intellectual property
protections so as to limit the transaction cost losses attendant to excessive
propertization. An extended case study of the historical evolution of property
regimes in the semiconductor market illustrates in detail this cautiously
optimistic view: concentrated interests appear to periodically adjust
propertization outcomes through cooperative arrangements that alleviate the
transaction cost burden imposed by a property rights regime.
The organization of the Article is as follows. In Part I, I construct the
conceptual framework for a process-based analysis of propertization outcomes
in innovation markets. In Part II, I apply this framework to identify both a
"mistake scenario" where the market driven selection mechanism is likely to
generate excessive propertization outcomes and a "correction scenario" where
adversely affected innovator populations are likely to reverse or mitigate those
outcomes. In Part III, I use this theoretical apparatus to develop a generic
template for regime selection in innovation markets, which is then applied to
generate a customized regime path that traces the historical evolution of
innovation regimes in the semiconductor industry.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS REGIME SELECTION
In this Part, I build the conceptual foundations for this Article's process-
based analysis of intellectual property expansion. First, I argue that
io. See infra Section II.C.
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propertization outcomes are principally a function of private lobbying,
adoption, and enforcement expenditures. Second, I provide a simple taxonomy
of innovation regimes among which the market selects as it allocates resources
to lobbying for, and then adopting and enforcing, state-provided property
entitlements. Third, I articulate a constrained social cost-benefit principle that
drives market movements along the regime path: namely, innovator
populations that satisfy certain predicate characteristics will tend to make
regime selections that implement a socially interested tradeoff between
innovation gains and transaction cost losses.
A. Effective Propertization
The expansion of intellectual property protections is usually construed in
formal terms as a function of legislative, judicial, and agency actions (the
relevant agencies being the Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) and the
Copyright Office). Consistent with this traditional approach, it is undoubtedly
the case - as the "too much property" thesis observes - that the past decades
have witnessed a substantial expansion in the subject matter that is formally
eligible for protection under the patent and copyright statutes, especially in
biotechnology, software, semiconductors, and nontechnical business
methods.1 But there is an important qualification to this common observation:
formally eligible does not mean actually used and enforced. Frequent
characterizations of excessive propertization -for example, isolated references
to "crazy" patents issued by the PTO-fail to take into account this critical
difference between formal enactment and actual adoption and enforcement,
thereby easily overstating the effective level of propertization."2 A merely
formal approach can substantially overestimate the effective level of
propertization in any innovation market, principally because simple
11. For an extensive historical review of these subject-matter expansions in the patent context,
see Robert Greene Sterne & Lawrence B. Bugaisky, The Expansion of Statutory Subject Matter
Under the 1952 Patent Act, 37 AKRON L. REv. 217 (2004). For further discussion of subject-
matter expansion in the case of nontechnical business method patents, see infra notes 68-74
and accompanying text; in the case of software, see infra note 70; in the case of
biotechnology, see infra note 56; and in the case of semiconductors, see infra notes 158-159
and accompanying text.
12. For similar thoughts, see Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 19
(20o8); Robert P. Merges, The Uninvited Guest: Patents on Wall Street, ECON. REV., Fourth
Quarter 2003, at 1, 6-7.
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promulgation through legislative, judicial, or agency action is only the first
and, almost certainly, least costly step in the propertization process.
13
As depicted below in Figure 1 (using hypothetical values), throughout I
view any propertization outcome as the aggregate result of four
implementation actions, progressively increasing in cost as a general matter:
(i) formal promulgation of the relevant entitlement by legislative, judicial, or
agency action; (ii) interpretation and application of the relevant entitlement by
courts and issuing agencies; (iii) registration, notice, deposit, application, and
other actions necessary to adopt the relevant entitlement; and (iv) enforcement
of the relevant entitlement through monitoring activities, licensing
negotiations, and actual or threatened litigation ending in trial or settlement.
13. In particular, Figure 1 does not capture: (i) increases in the length of copyright and patent
terms; (ii) increases (or decreases) in the ease of showing eligibility when applying for the
relevant entitlement and infringement when bringing suit, especially relevant in the patent
context; and (iii) increases (or decreases) in the typical range of damages awards and the
availability of injunctive remedies. For a semiformalized attempt to measure propertization
against a broader set of relevant factors, see RE. Evenson & Jonathan D. Putnam,
Institutional Change in Intellectual Property Rights, 69 AM. J. AGPJC. ECON. 403 (1987). For a
qualitative discussion that describes multiple factors that can subject intellectual goods to a
property rights regime, see Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a
Property Paradigm, 54 DuKE L.J. 1, 18-25 (2004).















Subject to the inherent distortions of "political noise" in the supply of
intellectual property protections, all these implementation actions are entirely
or substantially undertaken through, or in response to, resource expenditures
by innovators or other affected populations. Formal extensions and subsequent
applications by the state (including, in the patent context, field-specific
examination criteria released periodically by the PTO) are undertaken in
response to lobbying expenditures while adoption and enforcement actions are
taken directly and demand substantial out-of-pocket expenditures by
entitlement holders."i An emphasis on the determinative role of private
14. The horizontal axis is "normalized" so that "o" designates zero propertization and "1"
designates complete propertization. Note that this Figure is simplified to the extent that: (i)
lobbying activities are confined to the promulgation and application stages, which will be a
simplification in some cases where the legislature, agencies, or courts contemplate
modifications to previously promulgated entitlements; and (ii) the application of
promulgated entitlements by the courts or relevant agencies may sometimes lower
propertization levels or, alternatively, may be collapsed into the adoption and/or
enforcement rubrics.
15. Some enforcement and administrative expenditures are made by government agencies
(which in turn can be construed as a function of lobbying by entitlement holders). As a
practical matter, however, (i) "out-of-pocket" administrative costs are negligible since the
PTO is now fully "self-funded" and the Copyright Office is partially "self-funded" by filing
and other fees; and (ii) government enforcement expenditures fall well short of private
expenditures (and can therefore be safely omitted for analytical convenience). For a review
of federal enforcement of criminal statutes against counterfeiting and other intellectual
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influence on public laws is hardly foreign to intellectual property scholarship,
which has closely documented that patent and copyright legislation is heavily
guided and sometimes even negotiated by industry representatives, up to and
including drafting of statutes and even congressional committee reports. 6 But
legislative action is at best half the story. Once promulgation by the courts or
legislature and robust application by the courts and/or agencies is achieved, the
implementation process cannot be completed without substantial and
continuing expenditures to support adoption and enforcement.17 This is
neither an easy nor an inexpensive task given the intrinsically high definition
and exclusion costs that characterize intangible assets, which in turn require
investments in adoption and enforcement activities to an extent not typically
necessary in tangible-good contexts. To protect its creative or technological
assets by recourse to legal entitlements, a firm must make substantial
expenditures to establish an internal administrative apparatus, hire or retain
legal counsel, prepare application and registration documents and pursue
relevant actions with the issuing agency, monitor intellectual property
generation within the relevant organization, detect infringements by third
parties, and take legal action against identified infringers.
These mundane activities are critical: without sufficient investments in
adoption and enforcement, the underlying formal entitlement will wane in
importance, resulting in a vestigial entitlement that has little practical effect. 8
Available data from the patent context show the impressive magnitude of these
property crimes, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE'S TASK FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (20o6), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/
documents/ipreport619o6.pdf.
16. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53
VAND. L. REv. 1857, 1875 (2000) [hereinafter Merges, Intellectual Property Rights]; Robert P.
Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 19oo-2ooo, 88 CAL. L. REv.
2187, 2200-01 (2000). On the extensive involvement of industry representatives in the
drafting and negotiation of copyright legislation, see Jessica D. Litman, Copyright,
Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987); and Jessica D. Litman,
Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 276-78 (1989).
17. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
18. The reverse is also possible: a weak level of formal intellectual property protection may
effectively be enhanced through aggressive enforcement actions by entitlement holders.
Several scholars have recently pursued variations of this scenario in the copyright context,
arguing that aggressive threats of infringement litigation against cash-poor and/or risk-
averse firms or individuals can lead to licensing practices that effectively extend the scope of
the corresponding intellectual property entitlement and are sometimes subsequently
entrenched through judicial decisions. See Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright
Overenforcement, 93 IowA L. Rev. 1271 (2008); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights
Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007); Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REv. 1899 (2007).
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required expenditures, both individually and in the aggregate. While available
estimates vary, it is agreed that aggregate application and litigation
expenditures run into several billions of dollars annually,19 which, given
relatively meager government expenditures on enforcement actions,2"
constitute the lion's share of total social resources allocated to implementation
of the patent system. A partial measure of adoption costs can be obtained
simply by reference to the filing, maintenance, and other fees paid to the PTO
in fiscal year 20o8 and the Copyright Office in fiscal year 2007, which amount
to $1.625 billion and $24.7 million respectively." Both figures omit the
substantially larger fees paid to attorneys and other specialists during the
application process. Available estimates of PTO fees plus legal fees are roughly
$20,000 per patent, which still covers only a minority of a fully maintained
patent's lifetime cost, including renewal fees,22 costs relating to PTO appeals
and interference proceedings, and/or costs relating to foreign patent
applications.2 ' Even if a firm rationally incurs adoption (and subsequent
renewal) costs, fears of runaway litigation costs may then drive it rationally to
forego expenditures on subsequent enforcement, thereby entirely or partially
ig. On adoption and enforcement costs, see Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent
Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1498-1502 (2001), which estimates $4.33 billion for annual
patent prosecution costs and $2.1 billion for annual litigation costs. On enforcement costs,
see Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 470 (1995),
which estimates that patent litigation begun in 1991 will generate total legal expenditures of
approximately $1 billion.
20. See supra note 15.
21. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: FISCAL YEAR
ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2007 (2007) http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2007/
ar2007.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 56 (2008) http://www.uspto.gov/web/offlces/com/annual/
20o8/2oo8annualreport.pdf. For the PTO, immediately prior years show slightly lower
figures: $1.5o7 billion in 2007, $1.384 billion in 2006, and $1.198 billion in 2005. U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra, at 56.
22. Renewal fees are due at three and a half, seven and a half, and eleven and a half years after
patent issuance. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2000).
23. See Lemley, supra note 19, at 1498-99 (estimating $xo,ooo-$3o,ooo as the cost of a typical
patent application, including legal fees, but excluding subsequent renewal fees); Jonathan S.
Masur, Costly Screens and Valuation Asymmetries 20 (Univ. of Chicago Law & Economics,
Olin Working Paper No. 393, 20o8), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1105184 (estimating
$22,000 as the cost to prosecute an average patent application, including attorneys' fees, but
excluding subsequent renewal fees). Obtaining patent protection in other jurisdictions adds
substantial additional costs, potentially exceeding $1oo,ooo (depending on the number of
jurisdictions). U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: FEDERAL ACTION




releasing the relevant asset into the public domain. These fears are well
founded: the most recent estimates show that median patent discovery and
litigation costs are $2.5 million and $4 million respectively in the case of
litigations involving (as is typical) claimed damages in excess of $25 million, '
which rival corresponding costs in other fields of civil litigation.25
The big picture is clear: any robust level of intellectual property protection
is dependent on (i) one-time (or, in some cases, a series of) fixed-cost lobbying
expenditures to generate the initial set of legal entitlements, followed by
(ii) continuing variable-cost expenditures of several billions of dollars annually
by entitlement holders, who consume legal entitlements as determined by
marginal private cost-benefit valuations. So long as we allow for the possibility
that marginal expected costs may sometimes run ahead of the marginal
expected benefits of property rights coverage, it follows that a firm's actual
consumption of intellectual property rights - specifically, its decision whether
to adopt and then enforce an intellectual property entitlement- must
sometimes fall below a firm's theoretically available levels of intellectual
property rights as a matter of formal law. As I describe immediately below,
indicative data in the patent context suggest that the gap between actual and
theoretically possible consumption levels is substantial, which means in the
aggregate that a substantial percentage of all patent-eligible intellectual
goods-even goods that are eligible for formally robust protections-are
regularly given over to the public domain or, at least, are not protected to the
maximum extent afforded by the underlying set of legal entitlements. This is
functionally equivalent to a real property regime where, given high
administration and enforcement costs, most potential entitlement holders fail
to defend title, leaving it up for grabs to third parties who may seize it by force
or simple occupancy.
A brief exercise to quantify this gap between actually implemented and
theoretically available protection levels in the patent sector is enlightening. The
Figure below depicts a reasonable estimate of the relative distribution of
patentable assets among (i) unpatented; (ii) patented; (iii) patented and
renewed beyond "mid-term"; and (iv) patented, renewed (beyond mid-term)
and licensed or enforced assets. Understandably, there are no precise data on
the percentage of patentable assets that are not actually patented (region A
24. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 3 n.1 (2003) (citing AM. INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW AsS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2003, at 22 (2003)),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2oo3/lo/cpreport.shtm.
25. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on
Patent Litigation, 9 LEwIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 25 (2005).
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makes what must be a very conservative estimate of roughly eighty percent).
However, there are data on renewal rates: in jurisdictions with periodic
renewal requirements (the United States, for example), recent data show that
approximatelyfify percent of all patents lapse due to failure to pay renewal fees
through the mid-point26 of the twenty-year statutory term27 (region B) and, in
European jurisdictions with annual renewal requirements, older data show that
approximately ninety-five percent of all patents lapse due to failure to pay
renewal fees sometime prior to the end of the statutory term (not shown). 8
Hence, even if we make the more conservative assumption that all patent-
eligible assets are patented, then patent protection on over half of those assets
lapses by the middle of the term, and virtually all protection lapses sometime
prior to the end of the term. Given exorbitant legal fees relating to
infringement litigation and substantial fees relating to licensing negotiations, it
is reasonable to assume that a significant portion of the remainder pool of even
renewed patents lapse because entitlement holders decline to incur some or all
of these costs, either by declining enforcement or by accepting a below-market
settlement offer (region C). 9 It therefore follows that substantially
implemented patent protection beyond the mid-term point (region D) is
almost certainly an exception, not the norm, within the total pool of patent-
eligible intellectual goods. Fully implemented patent protection through the
end of the term (not shown) is close to a negligible minority of the total pool of
patent-eligible goods, in which case the effective term and scope of patent
z6. To be precise, the final maintenance fee payment is due eleven and a half years after issuance
of the patent. See 35 U.S.C. S 4 1(b) (2000). Fees are $4,110 or, in the case of a "small entity,"
$2,055. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FY 2009 FEE SCHEDULE (2009),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/ofices/ac/qs/ope/fee2oo9januaryo12oo9mayol.htm#partapp.
27. See Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1526 (2005) (finding
that 53.71% of U.S. patentees that issued patents in 1991 allowed the patents to expire for
failure to pay maintenance fees sometime prior to twelve years after issuance).
28. P.J. FEDERICO, RENEWAL FEES AND OTHER PATENT FEES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, STUDY OF
THE SUBCOMMITrEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE, 85th Cong., at 27, 29-30 (2d Sess. 1958) (showing, for the
period 1930-1939, the following renewal rates for the following countries in the following
years: Great Britain (year 16, 5%), Germany (year 18, 2.2%), Sweden (year 17, 4.6%), France
(year 20, 2.9%) and the Netherlands (year 18, 2.2%)).
z9. It appears that only a small percentage of all issued patents are licensed, and even fewer are
litigated. See Lemley, supra note 19, at 1507 (estimating that only about five percent of issued
patents are licensed for a royalty, not including cross-licenses). While not based on hard
data, Lemley's conjecture is consistent with other data that imply an extremely skewed
distribution of patent values. See F.M. Scherer & Dietmar Harhoff, Technology Policy for a
World of Skew-Distributed Outcomes, 29 RES. POL'Y 559, 56o tbl.1 (2000).
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protection are drastically smaller than would appear to be the case based on the
formal law.
Figure 2.
THE "IP EXCEPTION" (PATENTS) 30
This disjuncture between formal law and effective law reaches its apex in
the case of entire intellectual property statutes that are mostly form and little
substance (meaning that the combined size of regions B + C + D is nominal in
these cases). This category includes multiple sui generis entitlements that are
formally available but have generated low application and litigation volumes
over the lifetime of the underlying statute. This intellectual property graveyard
includes (in varying degrees of rigor mortis): the Design Patent Act,3 Plant
Patent Act,32 Plant Variety Protection Act,33 Semiconductor Chip Protection
3o. All relative values are hypothetical for expository purposes but, as discussed in the text,
based on reasonable assumptions given available data. Increasingly dark coloration indicates
increasing propertization, and vice versa. Each region is understood to encompass all
regions situated closer to the circle's center (that is: B + C + D is a subset of A, C + D is a
subset of B, and D is a subset of C). The Figure is not drawn precisely to scale.
31. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (20o6). The Act provides limited-duration patent protection for useful
articles that are otherwise ineligible for protection under the copyright statute. On its
limited usage, see William S. Thompson, U.S. Design Protection: Discussion of Status and
Suggested Proposals, 24 AIPLA QJ. 393, 394-95, 404-05 (1996).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 161-164. The Act provides sui generis protection on asexually reproducing
plant varieties. On its limited usage, see Judith I. Stallman & A. Allan Schmid, Property
Legend
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Act,' and the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act.35 These "dead" statutes (that
is, underadopted and underlitigated) are the most striking illustrations of the
fundamental relationship between private investment and entitlement
strength: without sufficient resources continuously allocated to adoption and
enforcement actions, even the most potent formal protections lose practical
importance.
B. Graduated Propertization
If we adopt the view that the market largely selects propertization outcomes
through expenditures on lobbying, adoption, and enforcement actions, then
we must identify the set of propertization outcomes (or innovation regimes)
among which the market may make its selection. The familiar menu studied by
legal and economic scholars typically offers a simple choice between (i) a
property regime, which is the practical equivalent of complete or substantially
complete propertization; and (ii) a commons, which is the practical equivalent
of zero or nominal propertization. This dichotomy in turn drives the
conventional assumption that the high transaction cost burden of a formal
property regime is the necessary social price that must be paid in order to
preclude the underinnovation outcome that prevails without it. But an
extensive empirical literature on informal governance arrangements for
common pool resources transcends this binary taxonomy, providing abundant
examples where private parties establish and maintain limited access sharing
regimes that lie at various points in the intermediate region between an open
access commons and closed access property regime. This imposes some limits on
unauthorized usage (thereby partially internalizing negative externalities that
otherwise result in overconsumption), but without incurring all of the
Rights in Plants: Implications for Biotechnology Research and Extension, 69 AM. J. AGRic. ECON.
432 (1987).
33. 7 U.S.C. § 2321-2S82. The Act provides sui generis protection on sexually reproducing plant
varieties. On its limited usage, see Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety
Protection: Sound and Fury ... ?, 39 Hous. L. REv. 727 (2002). Note that certain plant
varieties can now be protected under the general patent statute, which has bolstered
property rights protections in this market. See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 901-914. On its limited usage, see infra note 16o and accompanying text.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 1301-1332. The Act provides sui generis protection on "moldings," or designs
for recreational boat hulls. On its limited usage, see Bradley J. Olson, The Amendments to the




transaction costs of a state-administered property regime. 6 The same is clearly
true of innovation markets (which face the converse problem of internalizing
positive externalities that otherwise result in underinvestment): not all vigorous
innovation markets are protected by any, or any robust, formal intellectual
property protections, which (provided we retain the conventional assumption
that imitation always depletes returns on innovation) necessarily implies an
intermediate case where a remunerative mechanism other than state-provided
property rights sustains innovation incentives.
This graduated scheme of propertization outcomes is depicted below:
sharing regimes occupy a broad intermediate region of lesser to greater
propertization bounded on each side by zero to nominal propertization in the
case of a commons regime and complete to near complete propertization in the




Commons Sharing Regimes Property
Transaction Costs
36. For the leading source, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
37. Consistent with the prior Figure, increasingly dark coloration indicates increasing
propertization, and vice versa.
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As I describe in detail in a companion publication, 38 this intermediate
region is occupied both historically and currently by variants of a mixed
exclusionary structure that stands between the zero propertization of a
commons regime and the full propertization of a property regime. This hybrid
regime, explored extensively in the real property context but to a far lesser
extent in the intellectual property context,39 can be described generically as
follows. The relevant innovation asset is freely or substantially exposed to
imitation, thereby resembling a commons regime that cannot independently
generate any remunerative stream for the original innovator, but is bundled
with collateral assets that are legally, extralegally, or technologically protected
against lower cost imitation, thereby providing an allied exclusionary
instrument that in turn generates a remunerative stream to the original
innovator.
To provide a concrete illustration, consider the imitation threats faced by a
financial services firm that periodically releases new investment products (for
simplicity, assume prior to the definitive recognition of business method
patents in the Federal Circuit's 1998 State Street decision40 ). The conceivable
product space covers a broad gamut of financial instruments: debt, equity, or
equity-linked securities; call options, put options, and futures contracts;
actively or passively managed mutual funds; exchange-traded funds; real estate
investment trusts; money management accounts; annuities and other
insurance products; and so on. Since any new product is (in our historical
38. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Sharing in the Shadow of Property: Rational Cooperation in Innovation
Markets (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Paper Series No. 87, 2008). Note
that, in the companion piece, I describe both (i) a hypothetical "pure form" sharing regime
that relies exclusively on reputation-driven social norms to sustain innovation incentives
and (ii) a variety of actual "mixed-form" sharing regimes where a substantial portion of the
innovation pool is unprotected by legal barriers but there exist collateral legal and extralegal
imitation barriers that protect some other portion of the aggregate product and services
bundle. The sharing regime described above corresponds to the latter variety, which has far
broader application in economically intensive settings. As I show in the companion piece,
the former has virtually none.
39. For contributions that apply a "semicommons" concept to the intellectual property context,
see Brett H. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007); and
Robert A. Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127 (2003). For
explorations of mixed property regimes more generally, see Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic
Analytics of Property Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 79 (2001); Carol H. Rose, The
Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83
MINN. L. REv. 129 (1998); and Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering
in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000).
40. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). For
further analysis of the decision, see infra Section II.A.
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setting) ineligible for patent protection 4' and therefore exposed to lower cost
imitation by third party competitors, it appears that the bank operates in a
commons regime that fails to sustain innovation incentives, given that imitator
firms bear none of the development costs and risks borne by an innovator firm.
But this conclusion is inaccurate, as evidenced simply by the fact that an
abundant number of new securities, accounts, and other investment products
have been regularly introduced into the market despite being prone to (and
actually subject to) widespread imitation.41 In actuality, the apparent anomaly
is easily solved: the bank operates in a sharing regime where (i) the core
innovation asset (namely, the investment product) is largely unprotected,
either by legal, technological, or extralegal instruments, and therefore is
immediately thrown into the collective industry pool, but (ii) the collateral
assets are substantially protected against third party imitation, either by legal
instruments in the case of trademarked brand names (and associated
goodwill), contractual rights, or technological characteristics in the case of all
other product attributes.
43
The Figure below depicts the appropriation infrastructure that supports
this result: while third party competitors can freely replicate the bank's product
innovation (which is therefore forfeited to the collective industry pool), this is
not true of the bank's collateral assets -distribution and marketing
relationships; production and distribution efficiencies; economies of scale and
scope; "learning by doing"; and tacit knowledge44- that must be replicated in
order to substantially imitate the total bundle of relevant product
41. Prior to the State Street decision in 1998, it had been commonly understood that patent
protection was unavailable for financial instruments, following the historical bar on
patenting abstract ideas and mathematical formulae, which case law had extended to bar
business-method patents. See Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 16o F. 467, 469 (2d
Cir. 19o8).
42. See Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE
(George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2007) (estimating that from 1980-2001, 1200 to 18oo
new types of securities were released into the market); see also Peter Tufano, Financial
Innovation and First-Mover Advantages, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 213, 215 (1989) (showing that fifty-
eight financial innovations in corporate and mortgage-backed securities were used to raise
11.6% of the dollar volume of all U.S. public offerings during the period 1974-1987)
[hereinafter Tufano, Financial Innovation and First-Mover Advantages].
43. Consistent with this view, empirical inquiry has shown that first-mover innovators accrue
substantial returns even though successful financial products are subject to imitation. See
Tufano, Financial Innovation and First-Mover Advantages, supra note 42, at 230-35. For further
discussion of alternative appropriation instruments in the financial market, see Merges,
supra note 12, at 4-5.
44. For detailed discussion of these alternative appropriation instruments, see Jonathan M.
Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDozo L. REv. 1251, 1257-69 (2004).
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characteristics. By bundling the legally unprotected core asset with collateral
assets subject to technological, legal, or extralegal protections, the innovator
firm can protect substantially against the diversion of economic rents to
competitors. The result: even assuming no legal protection against imitation of
the core innovation asset, the firm can reasonably anticipate a positive
remunerative stream from a successful innovation.
Figure 4.







Even if largely adopted for purposes of analytical expedience, the standard
property/commons taxonomy obscures the rich complexity of actual
innovation regimes, which encompass a variety of hybrid arrangements that
offer a workable incentive structure for avoiding the standard underinnovation
outcome without primary, or sometimes any, recourse to state-provided
property rights. A sharing regime is a plausible, inherently attractive alternative
to a property regime: if successful, it supports innovation incentives through
remunerative streams partially shielded from third-party appropriation while
sustaining a collective innovation pool that alleviates the transaction cost
45. Consistent with the previous Figures, increasing coloration indicates increasing strength of
barriers to imitation. Note that "brand name" is given a darker coloration because it is




expenditures that would otherwise inhibit subsequent innovation, which in
turn substantially reduces the social price that must otherwise be paid to
induce innovation investment. Based on repeated empirical surveys
consistently showing that most industries place limited reliance on patent
protection but substantial reliance on extralegal instruments to capture
innovation returns46 (and consistent with evidence described above indicating
that innovators widely decline to maximally exploit available patent
protections47), a sharing regime that mixes legal appropriation instruments,
extralegal appropriation instruments, and open access zones represents by
implication the typically adopted appropriation strategy in a large number of
innovation markets. Multiple industries stand somewhere in between the
commons/property alternatives at the ends of the propertization continuum:
while some intellectual assets in the relevant market are securely protected by
legal barriers, the substantial remainder are forfeited to an open-access
innovation pool (or in milder variants to be discussed subsequently, limited-
access innovation pools), while difficult-to-imitate or otherwise excludable
collateral assets cover any resulting appropriability shortfall.
C. Propertization Theses (or Demsetz Meets Marx Meets Coase)
If (i) we adopt the view that innovation regimes are largely a function of
private expenditures on implementation actions; and (ii) we further adopt the
view that innovation regimes are best situated along a graduated range of
propertization outcomes, then we can complete our conceptual toolkit by
identifying the selection mechanism that drives innovators' choice of
implementation actions, which in turn substantially determines the
propertization outcome. This line of inquiry necessarily takes as its point of
departure the leading economic theory of property rights formation, as
famously stated by Harold Demsetz. Namely, a society will expend additional
resources to establish, administer, and secure property rights so long as (and
46. For the leading studies showing limited reliance on patent protection, see C.T. TAYLOR &
Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH
EXPERIENCE (1973); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research
and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783; Edwin Mansfield, Patents
and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173 (1986); and Wesley M. Cohen,
Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000). For similar results in an earlier study, see
FREDERIC M. SCHERER ET AL., PATENTS AND THE CORPORATION: A REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL
TECHNOLOGY UNDER CHANGING PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed. 1959).
47. See supra Section I.A.
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only so long as) asset values sufficiently increase relative to rights
administration costs48 (and/or, as Demsetz clearly implied and subsequent
commentators clarified, rights administration costs sufficiently fall relative to
asset values 49 ). As further developed in the institutional economics literature,
this thesis is usually formulated more generally as stating that any market
dedicates resources to the promulgation and enforcement of property rights
just up to the point where marginal internalization gains equal marginal
internalization costs.50 In applying this social cost-benefit calculus to the
intellectual property context, it is important to observe (as stated at the outset)
that innovation typically proceeds in a cumulative sequence consisting of an
48. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Propery Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
49. See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989); GARY D. LIBECAP,
CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989); Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution
of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975). As noted
previously, this is not intended to be a complete statement of the welfare effects of increased
levels of intellectual property coverage; there may be social costs in addition to transaction
cost losses that must be offset against innovation gains. In particular, this standard omits
the deadweight losses that are usually associated with increased levels of intellectual
property protection as a result of output constraints imposed by intellectual property
holders who rationally implement supracompetitive pricing, which in turn blocks efficient
sales to some users willing at least to pay a price equal to marginal cost. Even from a
consumer-welfare perspective, however, it is not clear that taking into account deadweight
losses would make any difference "on net" so long as we also take into account the
deadweight losses attributable to reduced levels of intellectual property protection. That too
results in a decline in output, which in turn implies blocked efficient sales to users who
would have been willing to pay the supracompetitive price that would have been demanded
by the hypothetical intellectual property rights holder. Multiple antitrust commentators
have expressed the view that the social costs to consumers from supracompetitive pricing are
far outweighed by the social costs to consumers from technological delay as a result of
reduced innovation. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law as Industrial Policy: Should Judges
and Juries Make It?, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 29, 31 (Thomas M.
Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992) (noting the widespread view among economists that
"innovation has been thought to contribute far more to our well-being than keeping prices
closer to costs through competition"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, in
ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra, at 119, 122 ("An antitrust policy that
reduced prices by 5 percent today at the expense of reducing by 1 percent the annual rate at
which innovation lowers the costs of production would be a calamity."); Donald F. Turner,
Basic Principles in Formulating Antitrust and Misuse Constraints on the Exploitation of
Intellectual Property Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 485, 485 (1985) (noting that "in the long run,
technological progress contributes far more to consumer welfare than does the elimination
of allocative inefficiencies caused by noncompetitive pricing").
50. See, e.g., PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 5 (Terry L. Anderson &
Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003). For leading contributions in the literature, see BARZEL, supra
note 49; LIBECAP, supra note 49; DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (199o); and ANDREW SCHOTTER, THE ECONOMIC
THEORY OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1981).
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initial innovation followed by a derivative flow of subsequent innovations,
which means that allocating entitlements over upstream innovations can
generate transaction costs that in turn impede downstream innovations."' This
cumulative sequence requires adjusting the Demsetz thesis such that
internalization gains from increased propertization are offset against
internalization costs in the form of both (i) transaction costs (understood
broadly to mean all costs relating to the administration, transfer, and
enforcement of intellectual property) 2 ; and (ii) subsequent innovation that
would have taken place but for those transaction costs.5 3 Note how transaction
costs act as the critical brake on propertization levels: if transaction costs were
set to zero, propertization could be confidently ratcheted up to cover all
product attributes, thereby achieving complete internalization of all social gains
(in the form of innovative output) at no offsetting social cost (in the form of
transaction costs and associated innovation losses).5
Following this adapted formulation, any given propertization outcome
generates a marginal net social gain only to the extent that, relative to some
weaker propertization outcome, it yields a cumulative stream of marginal
innovation gains (that is, initial plus subsequent innovation gains) in excess of
marginal transaction costs. Where this is not the case, the propertization
outcome is socially excessive: that is, it has depleted, rather than enlarged, the
51. On the sequential nature of most innovation processes, see WiLLIAM J. BAUMOL,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND THE STRUCTURE OF PAYOFFS 181-84 (1993). For the
leading economic analysis of sequential innovation, see Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the
Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
52. This broad definition is standard usage in the property rights literature. Note, however, that
I exclude: (i) costs related to appropriating the value of unprotected intellectual assets, which
would be reduced by intellectual property protections; or (ii) amounts paid to access protected
intellectual assets, which are transfer payments without any implications from a social
efficiency perspective.
53. A clarification and a caveat. First, note that subsequent innovation losses must be restricted
to subsequent innovation that still would have been generated under some weaker level of
propertization (either due to the assumption of intrinsic motivations or access to equivalent
technological inputs in the public domain). This is sometimes overlooked. Second, to
reiterate earlier disclaimers, see supra notes 7 and 49, the tradeoff stated above does not
completely describe the bundle of social costs and benefits generated by greater or lesser
levels of propertization.
S4- In a zero transaction costs world, the holder of any intellectual property entitlement would
rationally bargain to mutually efficient transactions with any derivative follow-on inventors.
I note that more complex economic analysis of the first-mover/second-mover scenario
stipulates additional conditions for this efficiency result to hold with certainty, although
these too can be at least partially satisfied by assuming prior agreements between first-
mover and second-mover innovators (which would by definition take place in a zero
transaction costs world). See Scotchmer, supra note 51.
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total social product relative to some weaker propertization outcome. The
Demsetz efficiency thesis (or what I will call the "Never Too Much Property"
(NTMP) thesis) implies by definition that this adverse outcome will never be
realized: that is, any observed increase in property rights coverage over any
given pool of innovation assets necessarily results in a net social gain by
generating marginal innovation gains in excess of marginal transaction costs
(otherwise it would never have taken place!). If "what is, is optimal," then the
expansionary trend in intellectual property coverage need not raise any alarm:
it simply constitutes a socially cost-justified adjustment of property rights in
response to an upward shift in relevant asset values (and/or a downward shift
in rights-administration costs). This does not seem wholly implausible:
historically, extensions of formal intellectual property coverage often appear to
correlate roughly with apparent increases in the economic value of the relevant
innovation market. Thus, software received increasingly stronger property
rights protection (from copyright to unclear patent to clear patent protection"5 )
roughly coincident with the rise of the personal computer and corresponding
growth in demand for software applications; and the biotechnology industry
received increasingly stronger property rights protection for some of its
products as technological advances in the life sciences started yielding valuable
research and therapeutic tools ;s6 and so on.
As is widely observed, however, this "happy" approach to property rights
formation suffers from a crucial shortcoming: namely, it fails to operationalize
the transition from commons to property and, consequently, fails to address
the obvious possibility that, given the inherent divergence between the public
55. The leading decision is Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), which recognized the
eligibility of software for patent protection so long as the software is implemented by a
process or apparatus that itself would be eligible for patent protection. This decision was
expanded subsequently to progressively remove the "process or apparatus" limitation. See
AT&T v. Excel Commc'ns, 172 F.3d 1352, 1356-6o (Fed. Cir. 1999) (following the decision in
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998), which rejected the claim that patentable software must have physical structure
associated with it, so long as it otherwise produces a "useful, concrete and tangible result");
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1540-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that the "statutory
process or apparatus" test is satisfied so long as the relevant claim is drafted to include a
general purpose computer or standard hardware or memory element necessary for useful
application of the relevant algorithm).
56. For the leading judicial decisions and agency actions, see Diamond v. Chakrabarry, 447 U.S.
303 (i98o), which upheld a patent on genetically engineering microorganisms; 1118 O.G. 19
(1987), which stated that PTO "now considers non-naturally occurring non-human
multicellular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter"; and
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991), which upheld a




interest and the private interests of market participants, the state's introduction
of property entitlements may not always (or some would say, may only
infrequently and accidentally"7 ) result in a net social gain. 8 Following this
distributive approach (which I will call the "Always Too Much Property"
(ATMP) thesis), excessive propertization outcomes are endemic, either actually
or at least potentially, given the disproportionate rent-seeking incentives and
capacities of large existing holders who seek to secure unequal resource
distributions, even if this yields a net social loss. Put differently: private parties
that exert determinative influence over state action have rational interests that
inherently diverge from the public interest, and hence, there can be no
confidence that rent-seeking investments will yield socially desirable
propertization outcomes. Applied strictly to the contemporary intellectual
property context, the ATMP thesis would necessarily imply that, despite
vigorous innovation in recently and substantially propertized markets such as
biotechnology, semiconductors, and software, these markets would have
generated an even higher net social product (equivalent to cumulative
innovation gains less transaction costs) under some weaker level of
propertization.
Translated into the more casual terms of popular and some scholarly
commentary on intellectual property, the rent-seeking critique corresponds
approximately to the oft-stated view that "Big Media," "Big Pharma," or "Big
Tech" consistently seeks to strengthen intellectual property rights to the
maximum extent possible as political conditions and resource constraints
allow, irrespective of whether doing so imposes (or precisely in order to
impose) high input costs on small innovators, thereby constraining entry, and
high retail prices on individual end users, thereby maximizing profits.5 9 In its
57. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 73, 110 (199o). Given this deficiency, the Demsetz thesis has been called a
"na've" theory of property rights formation. See THRAINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 250, 272-73 (1990).
s8. See Smart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359 (2002); Saul
Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (2003); Saul
Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421 (2002). In
the economics and political science literature, there exist several dedicated critiques of the
Demsetzian and related efficiency driven theories of institutional formation from a
distributive and/or strategic bargaining perspective. See, e.g., DANIEL W. BROMLEY,
ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC
POLICY (1989); JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT (1992); ITAI SENED, THE
POLITICAL INSTITUTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY (1997).
s9. For examples along these lines, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA
USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAw To LOCK DowN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATITY
(2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
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more sophisticated and nuanced forms, the ATMP thesis tracks the widely
expressed view that innovation markets suffer from an intellectual property
thicket (or "anticommons") where a misguided proliferation of property rights
stifles innovative output beneath access restrictions, dispute-resolution actions,
and other administrative burdens.6 At its core, the ATMP thesis certainly has
substantial merit- indeed, it is fully compatible with this Article's functionalist
view of propertization outcomes as largely the product of self-interested rent-
seeking expenditures. However, it has a crucial blind spot: at least in its less
nuanced formulations, the ATMP thesis almost certainly must be overstated as
a complete account of ultimate rights allocation outcomes since it necessarily
assumes that adversely affected populations never have sufficient incentives
and/or capacities to make adjustments that yield at least a socially preferable
propertization outcome. Not just almost certainly but actually: as we shall see
CONNECTED WORLD (2OO1); and James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the
Construction of the Public Domain, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33. This
is in an indicative, not complete, list of references. For reviews of this literature, see, for
example, R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants To Be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003).
6o. Other scholars have made similar observations. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kathryn L.
DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX.
L. REv. 1677, 1679 (2007) (noting but also challenging "the widely held belief that the rapid
growth in biotechnology patenting over the last decade is impeding innovation"); F. Scott
Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private Ordering Solution to the
Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. REV. 111, 112 (2007) (noting the recent "explosion" in the
intellectual property literature on the anticommons problem, which asserts that the
proliferation of patent rights can retard innovation). For the leading expression of the
anticommons thesis, see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 I-nARV. L. REV. 621 (1998), which states that excessively
fragmented property rights can generate net social losses by impeding, rather than
facilitating, innovation (or, in a broader real property context, other) investments; and
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998), which advances the same thesis with respect
to gene patents. For some of the most sophisticated arguments and empirical evidence
advanced in favor of various forms of the patent thicket thesis, see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL
J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS
AT RISK (2008); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To
DO ABOUT IT 4 (2004); and Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe,
Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2000). This is a highly selective list of references; a much
larger legal literature has applied the thicket and anticommons concepts in a variety of
contexts.
61. For related views, see Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1320-21 (1996), which argues
that the conventional approach falsely imagines that private parties can do little about
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subsequently, the extreme pessimism that characterizes the strongest versions
of the ATMP thesis is falsified by multiple instances where innovator
populations-and in particular, concentrated and well-endowed innovator
populations -that are adversely affected by increased propertization have
undertaken corrective actions to alleviate the attendant transaction cost
burdens on innovation activity, up to and including outright forfeitures of
valuable pools of knowledge assets.
To understand why this pessimistic prognosis is almost certainly false
merely as a blanket theoretical proposition, let us briefly revisit Demsetz
through the lens of Ronald Coase, who is the source of the most influential
theory of what might be called the private adjustment of state allocated
entitlements. Assuming zero transaction costs (and setting aside distributive
considerations), Coase shows that the initial allocation of any legal entitlement
is a matter of indifference from a social point of view because affected parties
will rationally bargain to the efficient reallocation.62 While this is obviously an
idealized state of affairs that will rarely be realized as a practical matter, it yields
the valuable implication that, where transaction cost obstacles are not
exorbitant, private parties will have rational incentives and at least some
capacity to adjust socially undesirable allocations of legal entitlements. This
well-known insight can in turn be applied to generate a working hypothesis
concerning an innovation market's potential ability to correct any excessive
allocation of intellectual property rights. Assuming that the Coasean condition
of minimal coordination costs is at least substantially satisfied, there is
reasonable confidence that the socially preferred outcome envisioned (but not
operationalized) by the Demsetz thesis (and entirely excluded by the rent-
seeking critique except as a matter of chance) will be substantially realized over
some reasonable period of time. This possibility will be realized so long as we
do not exclude an important (and entirely reasonable) contingency (which
must be the case for the too much property thesis to hold in any single
instance): namely, as the level of propertization increases, marginal transaction
costs accelerate, with resulting losses in the form of depressed subsequent
innovation, such that the diminishing stream of marginal innovation gains
cannot make up the difference. Where this is the case, further movement down
property entitlements incorrectly issued by the state and advances instead an approach that
focuses on parties' ability to modify legal entitlements through social norms and cooperative
institutions. For a similar statement in the property rights school more generally, see CARL J.
DAHLMAN, THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND BEYOND: A PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF AN
ECONOMIC INSTITUTION 220 (1980), which states that the property rights approach
recognizes that even the "losers in institutional change" can use bargaining power and/or
form voluntary associations to adjust the effective property rights allocation.
62. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (196o).
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the regime path toward complete propertization will fail to yield a net social
gain, in which case a less protected point on the regime path will be socially
(and, at least for some innovators, privately) preferred to any more protected
point.63 Given this contingency, even (and, as I shall argue shortly below,
especially) large entitlement holders-the presumptive culprits following the
ATMP thesis- may therefore have individually rational incentives to scale back
overextended intellectual property rights, thereby alleviating transaction costs
and enhancing the cumulative stream of innovative output in at least partial
consistency with the social interest.
In place of the ATMP thesis and the NTMP thesis, I pursue an
intermediate position, which I call the "Sometimes Too Much Property"
(STMP) thesis. The market will tend to adjust excessive allocations of
intellectual property entitlements in order to maximize the cumulative stream
of innovation gains net of transaction costs, assuming two conditions are
satisfied: (i) adversely affected innovators tend to be neither substantially net
users nor substantially net producers of the relevant pool of innovation assets,
which implies that innovators have a close-to-neutral bias relative to the
socially interested level of property rights coverage; and (ii) adversely affected
innovators tend to be few in number (or collectively organized) and occupy a
dominant market position, which implies strong individual incentives to
undertake costly efforts to promote, and low coordination cost obstacles to
reach collectively beneficial propertization outcomes. Substantial satisfaction of
these predicate conditions yields an approximate alignment over time between
private and social interests in selecting among the possible range of
propertization outcomes. First, resource holders that tend to be both producers
and users of intellectual assets-that is, they make substantial use of outside
63. This point recalls two important propositions found in the transaction costs literature on
property rights. First, Demsetz observed in another publication that complete markets may
sometimes be less preferred relative to incomplete markets to the extent that fully pricing all
externalities in a complete market is an activity that diverts resources to policing market
exchanges without necessarily generating commensurate social benefits in the form of
allocative efficiencies. See Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights,
7 J.L. & ECON. 11 (1964). Second, other commentators have shown that an increase in asset
values may not always precipitate further expenditures on rights enforcement since an
increase in asset values can attract greater third party investments in thievery, thereby
increasing policing costs that may swap any gains from increased propertization. See
Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino's Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the Optimal Value of an
Asset, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S339 (2002); Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42
KYKLos 319, 328 (1989). In more general forms of the latter point, other commentators have
observed that property rights over any given item may not be fully defined to the extent that
doing so generates transaction costs without commensurate efficiency gains. See BARZEL,
supra note 49, at 64-67.
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sources to access required innovation inputs -wish to accrue both
internalization gains, which requires more "property" (consistent with the
ATMP thesis), and to minimize at least some internalization costs, which
requires less "property" (consistent with the NTVP thesis) .64 Second, if group
size is small (or large but collectively organized) and occupies a dominant
portion of the relevant market, then the dilution of cooperation gains is
inherently limited, in which case adversely affected innovators may rationally
expect to accrue individual gains commensurate with individual expenditures
required to implement collectively beneficial adjustments to overpropertization
outcomes. 6s While the NTMP thesis assumes that the market always gets it
right by tending toward socially optimal propertization and the ATMP thesis
assumes that the market always gets it wrong (subject to getting it right
occasionally by chance) by tending toward socially excessive propertization, the
STMP thesis assumes that, taking into account some reasonable lag time
required to implement adjustments by adversely affected and economically
dominant interests, the market tends to get it at least substantially right over
time, in general moving between propertization outcomes situated in the
intermediate region between the exact perfection anticipated by the NTMP
thesis and the gross imperfection anticipated by the ATMP thesis.
II. ERRORS AND CORRECTIONS ON THE REGIME PATH
If the market always perfectly implemented the social cost-benefit principle
as it selected points on the graduated regime path (following the NTMP
thesis), then an erroneous propertization outcome would be an impossibility
(and the ATMP thesis would be a complete falsehood), since innovators would
rationally decline to use any extension of intellectual property coverage that is
not socially cost-justified relative to the existing set of legal and/or extralegal
appropriation mechanisms. 66 But this undiluted confidence in the regime
selection process would necessarily assume that collective rationality will
always coincide with individual rationality among innovator populations. To
examine the extent to which individually rational consumption of intellectual
property sometimes (but not chronically and irremediably, as the ATMP thesis
would imply) diverges from socially interested levels, below I explore stylized
64. For further discussion, see infra note 112 and accompanying text.
65. For further discussion, see infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
66. For the only dedicated statement of this view (to my knowledge), see Easterbrook, supra
note 2, at 412.
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movements between a property regime and a sharing regime6 7 for the purpose
of identifying circumstances where innovation markets are likely to select
and/or fail to correct socially excessive propertization outcomes within some
reasonable time frame. Whether or not the market fails or succeeds in this
endeavor is not a matter of chance. Consistent with the nuanced approach of
the STMP thesis (and contrary to both the pessimism of the ATMP thesis and
the optimism of the NTMP thesis), I advance the following hypothesis: (i)
where coordination costs are high, innovation markets are likely to fall into a
property trap that settles upon and cannot easily adjust socially excessive
propertization outcomes; but (ii) where coordination costs are low (and
adversely affected innovators have a close-to-neutral propertization bias),
innovation markets are likely to escape from the property trap by undertaking
collectively beneficial actions that directly or, perhaps of greatest practical
interest, indirectly correct socially excessive propertization outcomes. While the
property trap outcome is an inherent danger (so long as we assume conditions
that give rise to positive coordination costs), it may sometimes be a self-
correcting malady: even without state intervention, concentrated or well
organized innovator populations that tend to stand on both sides of intellectual
property transactions have rational incentives and inherent capacities to
overcome coordination cost obstacles in order to accrue joint gains from
recalibrating overextended levels of property rights coverage.
A. Falling into the Property Trap
Let us return to the financial services market prior to 1998. As described
earlier, this constituted a sharing regime that sustained innovative output
without intellectual property protections (other than trademark), thereby
sparing industry participants the transaction cost losses attendant to a formal
property regime. But not all is well in paradise. This cooperative idyll-which
arguably operated to the collective benefit of most firm participants -was
inherently unstable so long as any firm could, at some reasonable cost and at
some reasonable likelihood of success, "defect" by seeking, or more
aggressively enforcing, formal property rights protections made available by
67. Generally, I do not focus on market movements between a commons and a property regime,
which is the more typical focus in the economic and legal literature on the evolution of
property rights, both in the real-property and intellectual property contexts. This is both for
reasons of brevity and because I am of the view that the commons is not especially relevant,
for the simple reason that zero propertization usually does not offer a sustainable
environment for innovation investment. I address this point in greater detail in a companion
piece. See Barnett, supra note 38.
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the state. The Figure below depicts three possible defection actions (where "I"
denotes innovator) that can undermine a sharing regime, as follows:
Figure 5.
DEFECTION ACTIONS
Defect(petition) = Petition the legislature or agency for
extensions to existing intellectual property coverage
Defect(adopt) = File an application with the relevant
agency to issue an intellectual property entitlement over
novel subiect matter
Defect(enforce) = Adopt and enforce available but
"dormant" intellectual property protections
Defect(adopt) and defect(enforce) are the least costly forms of any unilateral
activation of formal property rights, corresponding approximately to "crazy"
patents issued by the PTO or "surprising" court decisions upholding novel
patent or copyright claims brought by "aggressive" entitlement holders, which
together drive the incremental process by which doctrinal limitations on
patentable or copyrightable subject matter are progressively dismantled. Over
the course of almost two decades, the financial services market underwent
incremental propertization as a result of defecting innovators that successfully
elicited agency or court action to expand available intellectual property
coverage. Starting in the 1970s, the PTO began to issue patents for
nontechnical business methods (equivalent to defect(adopt)), which had been
widely understood to be unpatentable, 8 and which led to a handful of
litigations (concluding in settlement). 6' Doubts arising from doctrinal
obstacles to legal enforceability -most notably, the historical bar on patenting
abstract ideas in general and mathematical algorithms in particular-were
68. For the decision establishing the business methods limitation (that is, the ineligibility of
non-technical methods of doing business for patent protection), see Hotel Security Checking
Co. v. Lorraine Co., 16o F. 467 (2d Cir. 19o8).
69. See Josh Lerner, Where Does State Street Lead? A First Look at Finance Patents, 1971-2000
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7918, 2000), at 8. For one such
litigation, see Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1368 (D. Del. 1983), which rejects a challenge to the validity of a
patent held by Merrill Lynch claiming a Securities Brokerage-Cash Management System.
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eroded by Federal Circuit decisions issued during the 198os and 199os and a
change in 1996 to PTO examination guidelines, which instructed examiners
that claims could not be rejected solely because they covered methods of doing
business.7" These doubts were ultimately cast aside by the Federal Circuit's
1998 decision, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,
which explicitly rejected the historical exclusion of business method patents. 7,
In that litigation, brought by a small financial services firm against a long-
established market leader in custodial services for the financial services
industry, the court rejected subject matter objections to a patent for a computer
implemented data processing system that facilitates the financial
administration of multiple mutual funds through a common investment
portfolio. 72 This progressive change in propertization outcomes, cultimating in
the State Street decision, led to a sharp rise in business method patent
applications, which, subject to periodic fluctuations, has continued through the
present day.73
But patenting volume alone is not sufficient to imply that complete or even
substantial propertization of the financial services sector was and is an
inevitable outcome of the 1998 decision and the extended sequence of defection
actions that precipitated it. Any successful defection action by a single
innovator formally promulgates a novel property regime, which in turn
displaces the existing sharing regime only to the extent that a substantial
70. The erosion of the business methods limitation is largely a function of the expansion of
protection for software applications. For the leading decisions that anticipated State Street,
see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187-88 (1981), which upheld a patent claim about a
process for curing rubber even though it "employs a well-known mathematical equation"
and stating generally that a claim directed to subject matter that is otherwise patentable does
not become unpatentable "simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer
program, or digital computer"; and In re Alappat, 33 F. 3 d 1526, 1542-44 (Fed. Cit. 1994) (en
banc), which, following Diehr, held that the statutory "process" or "machine" test for
patentable subject matter is satisfied so long as the patent claim "as a whole" is directed to an
apparatus to produce a "useful, concrete, and tangible result," even if the claimed machine
accomplishes that result through a mathematical formula that would not be patentable
subject matter by itself. In turn, these decisions were grounded in the Court's earlier
decision, Diamond v. Charkrabary, 447 U.S. 303 (198o), which generally counseled a broad
interpretation of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
71. 149 F.3 d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
72. Data Processing Sys. for Hub & Spoke Fin. Servs. Configuration, U.S. Patent No. 5,193,o56
(filed Mar. 11, 1991) (issued Mar. 9, 1993).
73. Robert M. Hunt, Business Method Patents and U.S. Financial Services 3-4 (Fed. Res. Bank of
Phila., Working Paper No. o8-1o/R, 2009), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/




portion of the general innovator population then similarly defects by allocating
resources to adopting the novel entitlement and enforcing it (equivalent to
defect(enforce)). If a formal intellectual property entitlement is unilaterally
introduced but then neither adopted nor enforced by most eligible holders,
then it can safely be concluded that the innovator population has rationally
declined to incur the expenditures necessary to implement it, thereby
perpetuating a sharing regime that persists in the shadow of a largely inactive
property regime. In electing whether to incur these implementation costs, any
repeat-player innovator must weigh the expected net payoff streams available
from two alternative actions: (i) the "sharing payoff' available by electing to
continue to cooperate with the existing sharing regime (practically equivalent
to declining to petition, adopt, or enforce property rights protections); and (ii)
the "property payoff" available by electing to defect into the property regime
following any of the defection actions indicated above. Any payoff amount is
constituted by the discounted present value of the cumulative stream of
innovation gains (that is, initial plus subsequent innovation gains) less
transaction costs and input costs. Whereas a property regime offers increased
innovation gains at the price of increased transaction costs and input costs, a
sharing regime offers reduced input costs and transaction costs at the price of
reduced innovation gains. If there already exist other mechanisms by which
innovators can capture innovation returns (a typical case), 74 then the marginal
gain in innovation returns under a property regime may be insubstantial and
fail to exceed the marginal losses attributable to the associated cost burden, in
which case innovators will rationally decline to adopt and/or enforce a novel
property right made available by the state.
Now suppose that most firms in the financial services industry conclude
that the sharing payoff exceeds the property payoff, in which case these firms
should rationally decline to exploit the newly available patent right, which
should in turn lapse into a practical nullity. But not all innovators will
necessarily reach this conclusion; in particular, a one-shot player who seeks to
maximize short-term payoffs (equivalent practically to the much maligned
"patent troll ' '75) will never reach this conclusion and, assuming reasonable
defection costs, will therefore vigorously pursue available legal protections.
Given that initial innovation gains accrue immediately while the losses from
74. For extensive discussion of these alternative instruments, see Barnett, supra note 44, at 1257-
69.
75. This is the widely used pejorative term for holding companies that acquire patents solely for
purposes of licensing the patent to operating companies in the relevant field or, failing an
agreement to license, litigating the patent to extract a settlement or infringement damages.
For further discussion, see infra notes 138-143 and accompanying text.
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transaction costs, input costs, and impeded subsequent innovation are mostly
incurred sometime in the future, the one-shot innovator rationally ignores
offsetting losses (other than immediate lobbying and/or litigation costs) and
seeks to accrue the marginal innovation gains immediately available under a
property regime. This observation reveals a crucial vulnerability of any sharing
regime: it is exposed to unraveling by the one-shot player who anticipates, or
any other "idiosyncratic" player who has some reason rationally to anticipate, a
higher net payoff stream under a property regime for the duration of its
anticipated participation in the market.76 To see why, suppose that an
idiosyncratic innovator (for example, the small financial services company that
initiated the State Street litigation) makes an unconventional patent application
that is surprisingly accepted by the PTO and then surprisingly upheld by a
court when its validity is contested by an alleged "nonidiosyncratic" infringer
(for example, the large financial services incumbent targeted in the State Street
litigation). This unilateral activation of formal property rights by even a single
firm may then sufficiently reduce the expected payoff available under the
existing sharing regime such that the general population of nonidiosyncratic
innovators rationally elects to defect into the novel property regime. This
outcome will result so long as any nondefecting innovator anticipates that, as
the number of defecting innovators increases, transaction costs and input costs
will rise sufficiently due to contraction of the common innovation pool and
expansion in the infringement claims pursued by defecting firms, such that a
sharing regime loses its relative cost advantage over a property regime. Absent
the ability to coordinate future migration, fears of an impending "patent flood"
become a self-fulfilling prophecy: individual rational actions to protect against
anticipated infringement claims and anticipated barriers to innovation inputs
drive full-scale deployment of a property regime even if joint payoffs would be
maximized under the existing sharing regime.
Figure 6 potentially illustrates this effect: an initial activation of property
rights by a single plaintiff in the State Street litigation has resulted in the
subsequent and rapid issuance of thousands of business methods patents in a
market that had previously supported robust innovation rates without formal
propertization and apparently had never previously lobbied for such rights.
77
76. In a companion publication, I provide greater content to idiosyncratic preferences for
defecting from a sharing regime, arguing that poorly endowed and richly endowed
innovators (who, respectively, are rationally excluded from or rationally decline to
participate in the collective innovation pool that sustains a sharing regime) are most likely to
abandon an existing sharing regime. See Barnett, supra note 38.
77. The Figure shows the number of patents classified (either on an "original" or "cross-
reference basis") under Class 705 of the U.S. Patent Classification system, which is
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Taking into account natural lags in the patent application process (on average
as of 2007, almost thirty-two months from application date to issue date78), we
can roughly observe that, following initial erosion of the business methods
limitation in 1994, patenting rates began to climb moderately and then climbed
sharply following the July 1998 decision that expressly lifted the business
methods limitation and continued in the same direction following a 1999
Federal Circuit decision that reaffirmed State Street 9 and a 1999 district court
ruling that issued a preliminary injunction in support of the notorious Amazon
"one-click" business method patent.s ° Patenting rates then spiked upward
again following settlements of approximately $50 million in August 2002 and
December 2003 by multiple financial exchanges with eSpeed, an aggressive
litigant of financial method patents, 8 and, since 2002, litigation by the "Data
Treasury" firm, which has brought suit against over fifty financial services
commonly associated with business method patents (and therefore includes, but is not
restricted to, financial method patents) and is called "Data Processing: Financial, Business
Practice, Management, or Cost/Price Determination." Sources for the data shown are from
Part Al, Table Al-2 of U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT COUNTS BY CLASS BY
YEAR (2OO8), http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/cbcby.htm. Note that Class 705 is both
underinclusive and overinclusive with respect to finance-related patents: (i) underinclusive
since some financial method patents may be classified under other categories and, of greater
relevance; (ii) overinclusive since some Class 705 patents may be business method patents
but not financial method patents. Nonetheless, Class 705 is a useful proxy for showing
general trends. For a similar approach, see Merges, supra note 12, at 4 tbl. For an approach
that creates a financial method patent data set by inclusion of limited subclasses, see Lerner,
supra note 69, at 904-05. For an introduction to the PTO classification system, see U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, Overview of the U.S. Patent Classification System (USPC),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/opc/documents/overview.pdf.
78. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 16 (2007), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/conVannual/2oo7/
2007annualreport.pdf. Corresponding values for 2004, 20o5, and 2006 are, respectively,
approximately twenty-eight months, twenty-nine months, and thirty-one months. Id.
79. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3 d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
go. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
The patent at issue is Method and System for Placing a Purchase Order Via a
Communications Network, U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997) (issued Sept. 28,
1999), which covers the technique of enabling consumers to make online purchases with a
single click, using payment information entered previously by the user.
81. For information on patent application and award rates through 2000, see Lerner, supra note
69, at 907 fig.i. For information on litigation relating to finance patents issued through
2003, see Josh Lerner, The Litigation of Financial Innovations (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working
Paper 09-027, 2008). For an example of a widely noted settlement, see Press Release, eSpeed
and New York Mercantile Exchange Reach Settlement Agreement on Wagner Patent (Dec.
22, 2003), available at http://www.espeed.com/articles/article20031222.htm, which reported
that eSpeed had settled a business method patent suit against New York Mercantile
Exchange for $8 million.
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firms with claims of over $1 billion in damages concerning a widely used
check-processing and transmission technology.82
Figure 6.
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Whether or not nonidiosyncratic innovators defect into a property regime
largely turns on the litigation risk imposed by the activated set of property
entitlements. Litigation risk is understood broadly to encompass both (i) input
costs in the form of anticipated settlement payouts to claimants; and (ii)
transaction costs in the form of legal fees, monitoring and reporting
procedures, or other costly precautions. A nondefecting innovator that elects to
cooperate with the existing sharing regime is an exposed litigation target to the
extent that either (i) it does not have its own portfolio of property rights with
82. The projected damages figure is based on a report issued by the Congressional Budget
Office, which calculated the amounts that could be demanded in a takings action against the
federal government by the "Data Treasury" patent holders in the event immunity were
granted to the alleged infringers. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, S.
1145, PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2007, at 2-3, 5-6, 11 (20o8), http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/89xx/doc8 9 81/sl145.pdf. Note that some defendants have already settled. See Latest
Data Treasury Settlements Add to Pressure on Defendants, Digital Transactions, Sept. 9, 2008,
http://www.digitaltransactions.nerinewsstory.cfm?newsid=1910 (noting settlements with
Bank of New York and others, leaving forty-seven remaining defendants, including Bank of
America and Citigroup).
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which to threaten, deter, or settle opportunistic litigation (or at least lower the
cost of settlement); or (ii) its privately practiced (but not publicly disclosed)
innovations may be claimed by a third party under the property regime (as can
be the case under the U.S. patent system, which usually does not recognize any
prior user defense83). In the patent context, litigation risk is further aggravated
by two additional factors. First, when patent protection is initially extended to
a new field of activity, inexperience on the part of the PTO, together with a
limited prior art database, may make it easier for "low quality" and/or
unjustifiably broad patents to be granted, thereby distorting upwards the scope
and number of patents in the relevant market, which in turn enhances
perceived litigation risk, and enhances incentives to migrate to the property
regime. Second, the U.S. patent system does not require disclosure of patent
applications until eighteen months following the initial filing (and no
disclosure until issuance in the absence of a foreign patent application), 8'
which can lead to overestimates of the perceived migration rate that in turn
give firms incentives to seek patent protection in the absence of any credible
commitment from other industry players that they will not do so (or have not
already done so). Innovators' perceptions of litigation risk may be further
exacerbated by the intermediary populations that derive income from the
adoption and enforcement of formal intellectual property rights (mostly
lawyers), who may have incentives to promote adoption of the property regime
among existing innovators by increasing the perceived defection rate, thereby
further depressing expected payoffs under the sharing regime and further
accelerating the actual defection rate.
B. Escaping the Property Trap
The property trap scenario approximately tracks the pessimism of the
ATMP thesis, which envisions that the state imposes property rights
protections even in markets that can sustain vigorous innovation without
them, which must then suffer the effects of constrained research and
83. Not coincidentally, the only exception to this statement is the business methods class of
patents, which is subject to a prior user defense, under legislation enacted in 1999 as a result
of financial industry pressure. For further discussion, see infra note 88 and accompanying
text.
84. All patent applications filed on or after November 29, 2000 must be published within
eighteen months of the date of filing, unless (i) the applicant requests that the PTO not
publish the application and (ii) the applicant has not filed an application for the same
invention in a foreign jurisdiction that also requires publication. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 122(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2000); American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
§ 4508, 113 Stat. i5oi (giving effective date).
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development. But there is a crucial qualification that fundamentally diverges
from the ATMP thesis: namely, the property trap is strictly dependent upon
the inability of adversely affected innovator populations to sufficiently
overcome coordination costs so as to undertake collectively beneficial actions
that would break the trap. Where this empirical fact does not hold (meaning,
coordination cost obstacles are overcome) and the innovator populations are
neither clearly net users nor net producers of the relevant pool of intellectual
assets, then there is substantially greater confidence that the market is likely to
move to a socially preferred point on the regime path that generates marginal
innovation gains in excess of marginal transaction costs."' Adversely affected
innovators can sometimes stop the slide into the property trap or, if not, climb
their way out, by taking two actions that limit the practical scope of intellectual
property coverage: (i) direct truncation, in the form of lobbying actions that, if
successful, result in formal modifications that weaken the relevant legal
entitlement; and (ii) indirect truncation, in the form of voluntarily formed
cooperative arrangements and other transactional structures embedded within
the surrounding property infrastructure, which is otherwise left formally
unchanged.
These remedial actions do not occur unpredictably. If coordination costs
are the "glue" that facilitates uncoordinated entry into a property trap, then
these adverse propertization outcomes will be systematically likely to be
corrected by innovator populations that exhibit characteristics that depress the
coordination costs that would otherwise give rise to and preserve selection
errors on the regime path. Truncation actions to halt an incipient property
trap, sustain the existing sharing regime, and/or form a novel cooperative
arrangement within an existing property regime, necessitate costly
contributions, either (i) in the direct case, as a result of lobbying actions to
reverse extensions of formal property rights; or (ii) in the indirect case, as a
result of litigation risk being incurred by, or innovation gains being forfeited
by, failure to adopt and/or vigorously enforce formally available property rights
against mutual participants in a voluntary cooperative arrangement. Small
number blocs of large participants or a collective trade organization that
represents a large number of small participants can alleviate the free-rider
85. This optimism characterizes an important minority of the intellectual property literature. See
WiLLiAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAw 18 (2004) (noting that increases in intellectual property protection that
adversely affect concentrated economic interests are likely to be resisted effectively); Merges,
Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 16, at 1873-74 (arguing that wholesale capture of
legislative decisions concerning the scope of intellectual property law is "not always present"
given the capacity of opposing groups to undertake countervailing actions).
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problem that discourages individual firms from making these costly
contributions toward the collective good in the form of an improved
propertization outcome.86 This proposition follows from a simple application
of public goods theory: small numbers and dominant market shares limit the
dilution of cooperation gains, which improves the likelihood that any
individual participant rationally anticipates that it will receive benefits that are
at least commensurate with its contributions to the collective good in the form
of an improved propertization outcome.8 ' Trade organizations can alleviate
free-rider obstacles that would otherwise discourage individually rational
contributions to sustain a collectively beneficial sharing regime by coordinating
each participant firm's contribution actions and spreading contribution costs
among a large pool of individual participants. And even where trade
organizations do not exist, profit-seeking entrepreneurs may emerge who self-
interestedly devise organizational solutions to alleviate the transactional
burdens borne by the adversely affected innovator population, which in turn
yields profit streams for the organizational entrepreneur.
These well-known conditions for collective action yield simple differential
expectations with respect to the market's self-correction capacities, as
anticipated by the STMP thesis. In unconcentrated industries, or in
concentrated industries where incumbents are completely integrated entities
that make little use of outside inputs, pessimists (and adherents of the ATMP
thesis) tend to win out: these markets are susceptible to being extensively
propertized by idiosyncratic activations of state-provided legal entitlements,
resulting in a property trap from which there may be no easy escape.
Conversely, in concentrated industries that consist of a small number of large
participants, or in unconcentrated industries that consist of a large number of
small participants that act collectively through a trade organization, and
assuming further that these firms or organizations rely substantially on outside
sources for required inputs, optimists (and adherents of the NTMP thesis)
tend to win out. To be sure, this is not to deny a meaningful scope of
application to the ATMP thesis: there are well-founded theoretical reasons to
believe that the market inherently tends toward overpropertization as a result
86. The free-rider problem in this context can be summarized as follows: without a credible
agreement to enforce individual contributions (or without collateral benefits to induce
individual contributions), each firm maximizes its individual payoff by declining to
contribute and instead choosing to enjoy the gains generated as a result of other firms'
contributions; thus, when no firm contributes, the public good is not funded and all firms
are left worse off.
87. For the seminal source on the superior lobbying and coordination capacities of small-
number and well-organized interest groups, see OLSON, supra note 9.
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of collective action failure in light of escalating input costs and transaction costs
imposed by incremental propertization. This in turn is exacerbated in the case
of firms that employ highly integrated research, development, and production
processes and therefore make little use of externally sourced technological
inputs. But it is critical to observe that these pathological tendencies stand and
fall- that is, the relevant innovator population may be substantially resistant to
collective action failure - largely as a function of the coordination costs and
propertization biases that characterize the relevant innovator population.
Where innovators tend to stand on both sides of intellectual property
transactions and litigations, which is most likely to occur in markets
characterized by cumulative innovation that compels even highly integrated
entities to access inputs from outside sources, innovators rationally take into
account the expected losses from socially excessive property rights coverage
and have incentives to undertake efforts to reduce it. And where coordination
costs are low, which is most likely to occur under concentrated market
conditions or unconcentrated market conditions subject to collective
organization, then privately interested firms inherently tend to have the
capacity to accomplish this objective.
1. Direct Truncation
The financial services market provides a possible illustration of the speed
with which a successful sharing regime can rapidly convert into a property
regime as a result of the unilateral defection of even a single firm. But that is
only half the story. The financial services market also provides a possible
illustration of the extent to which, and the speed with which, adversely affected
innovators can truncate an unwanted propertization outcome through
lobbying actions and constrained enforcement activity, which together cuts
back the effective level of property rights coverage, which in turn limits
litigation risk. This, in turn, can hold back defection rates that would otherwise
propel the market into further propertization. Below is the same Figure
depicting patenting rates over the past decade in business methods; however,
the indicated events now consist of a variety of actions undertaken by financial
services firms to restrain implementation of formally available property
entitlements. By July 1999, exactly twelve months after the State Street
decision, financial services firms had already achieved enactment of a unique
prior user defense, which protects against infringement claims over business
method innovations that have been practiced privately but never disclosed to
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the public,88 thereby directly reducing the litigation risk from staying outside of
the property regime and preserving some of the cost advantage of the sharing
regime.89 In March 2000, the PTO responded to public pressure by
introducing a second review process for "class 705" patent applications9" in
order to improve patent quality, which indirectly reduced litigation risk by
increasing the costs of obtaining patents, thereby reducing anticipated
adoption rates, which again preserves some of the cost advantage of the sharing
regime. At roughly the same time, Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon (the same
company that had aggressively litigated business method patents during the
initial "rush to patent"), floated a proposal to limit the term of business
method patents to three to five years and create an opportunity for the public
to submit prior art to patent examiners to filter out "bad" business-method
patent applications. 9 ' For purposes of our analysis, this represents an attempt
to induce market coordination so as to accrue joint gains from scaling back a
collectively injurious propertization outcome.
While the Bezos proposal for a sui generis reduced term for business
method patents was never adopted, leading players in the financial services
community are currently lobbying for general legislation to relax patent
protections92 and unique legislation that would grant specific immunity from
the Data Treasury litigation described above.93 These same business pressures
88. First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000).
89. For a similar observation, see Merges, supra note 12, at 6.
go. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A USPTO WHITE PAPER: AUTOMATED FINANCIAL OR
MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (2000), http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/
busmethp.
91. See Bezos and O'Reilly Spearhead Call for Patent Reform, OReilly.com, March 9, 2000,
http ://oreilly.conVnews/amazon-patents.html.
92. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, designated as S.515 (reported with amendments, Apr. 2,
2009) and H.R. 126o (introduced Mar. 3, 2009). For earlier bills, see Patent Reform Act of
2007, designated as S. 1145 and H.R. 19o8 (introduced Sept. 11, 2007). In 2008, financial
services companies or representative organizations which were signatories to an open letter
sent to members of Congress in support of the legislative reform package included: the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association; Visa Inc.; and the Financial Services
Roundtable (a financial services industry trade group). See Letter to The Honorable Harry
Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, and The Honorable Mitch McConnell, Republican
Leader, U.S. Senate, Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/comment-letters/
6165331o.pdf.
93. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lawmakers Move To Grant Banks Immunity Against Patent Lawsuit,
WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2008, at A22. This provision was included in the Senate version of the
2007 proposed patent reform bill, see supra note 92, and has been included in an alternative
version of the Senate's 2009 proposed patent reform bill, as introduced by Senator John Kyl
(R-AZ). See Stephen Albainy-Jenei, Patent Reform 2009: Still Too Many Competing Interests,
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have apparently been reflected by the Federal Circuit in recent decisions that
appear to narrow the scope of State Street to methods that are embodied in a
particular technological application, 4 culminating in 2008 in the decision in In
re Bilski.9 s In that decision, the court expressly reconsidered its 1998 decision,
in part on the basis of a large number of amicus briefs filed with the court
(including a brief by the financial services industry-as well as a brief by the
computer and communications industry-urging the court to overrule State
Street and its progeny). 6 While the court did not entirely repudiate State Street
and rejected any flat prohibition against business method patents or other
patents lacking a physical apparatus, it identified a "machine-or-
transformation test" promulgated in older Supreme Court jurisprudence97 as
the principal test for patentable subject matter and suggested that patent claims
that involve stand-alone "abstractions" would violate the long-standing
prohibition on patenting abstract intellectual concepts., 8 In re Bilski (now re-
named Bilski v. Doll) has now been accepted for review by the Supreme Court,
which will have an opportunity to clarify the standard for patentable subject
matter in the field of non-technical business methods (and perhaps more
generally).99
Hence, in the space of ten years and against the background of especially
high litigation risks posed by idiosyncratic resource holders, intensive
investment by an adversely affected and concentrated innovator population -
namely, large firms in the financial services community-has substantially
truncated a formally available intellectual property regime and, pending the
Patent Baristas, Mar. 24, 2009, http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2oo9/o3/24/
patent-reform-20o9-still-too-many-competing-interests.
94. See, e.g., Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Nuijten,
5oo F.3d 1346, 1352-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
95. 545 F. 3 d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
96. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Computer & Communications Industry Association in Support
of Appellee Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and Urging Affirmance, In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (No. 2007-1130); Brief for Financial Services Industry as Amici Curiae in
Support of Affirmance, In re Bilski, 545 F. 3d 943 (No. 2007-1130).
97. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954-60. For the leading historical source of this test, see Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), which was clarified (and narrowed) in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584 (1978). The Bilski court explicitly adopted (or readopted) the "machine-or-
transformation test" in lieu of the "useful, concrete and tangible result" test that had been
set forth by the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), and then
implemented by the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
98. In re Bilski, 545 F. 3d at 963-64.
99. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
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Supreme Court's review of In re Bilski, now threatens even to cause its near
demise. Lobbying actions have been complemented throughout by a policy of
constrained adoption and enforcement of financial method patents, whereby
each firm contributes to reducing perceived litigation risk by limiting its
accumulated stock of patent rights and its exercise of those rights. Consistent
with this mutual restraint strategy, large financial services firms generally have
only made a relatively modest number of patent applications"' and have
brought many fewer infringement suits under these patents."' Litigations to
enforce financial method patents have overwhelmingly been brought against
asset-rich investment banks, credit card issuers, and/or trading exchanges by
small-firm outsiders that typically have no business operations, acquired the
relevant patent from a third party, and/or lack the brand capital and other
bundled product attributes of a large financial services firm.0 2 It may seem
curious that firms expend resources to amass even a modest patent inventory
while failing to reap the fruits of these expenditures through infringement
actions (and taking lobbying actions to reduce the value of these entitlements).
But it is fully consistent with an effort by incumbent innovators (i) to partially
adopt state-provided property entitlements so as to limit litigation exposure to
enforcement actions by idiosyncratic holders, but (ii) to refrain from
enforcement (and to seek legislative changes that would limit enforcement) in
ioo. See Lerner, Litigation of Financial Innovations, supra note 81, at ii (noting that, for the period
1976-2oo3, the leading patentees are mostly information technology companies that
apparently patented innovations developed in the course of providing services to clients in
the financial services industry). Some firms within the financial services industry do appear
to have invested greater efforts in patenting financial method innovations than others. See
Tamara Loomis, Express Route, IP LAw & Bus., Aug. 2005, at 32 (reporting that American
Express adopted a more aggressive patenting strategy after having reached a settlement as a
defendant in a financial-method patent infringement suit).
ol. See Lerner, Litigation of Financial Innovations, supra note 81, at 11-12 (finding that, for the
period 1976-2005, patent holding companies are the most frequent plaintiffs in litigation
over finance patents); id. at 15 ("Patents assigned to individuals are five times more likely to
be litigated than those held by public corporations, and about 5o% more likely to be so than
those held by private firms, which include both smaller operating firms and patent holding
companies.").
102. See id. at 11-12, 15 (finding that, in the sample of firms that were issued finance patents
during 1976-2003, (i) firms with less than two hundred employees had initiated at least one
lawsuit per fmance patent; and (ii) firms with more than 200,000 employees had never
initiated a lawsuit to enforce a finance patent). For examples of relevant litigations, see Press
Release, eSpeed, Inc., eSpeed and New York Mercantile Exchange Reach Settlement
Agreement on Wagner Patent (Dec. 22, 2003), http://www.espeed.com/articles/
article200312n.htm (reporting that eSpeed had settled business method a patent suit
against the New York Mercantile Exchange for $8 million). I note that eSpeed is an affiliate
of Cantor Fitzgerald, a bond brokerage firm that does have an operational business.
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order to avoid a collective loss in the form of the transaction cost burdens
inherent to a fully deployed property regime.
Figure 7.
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2. Indirect Truncation
Popular and scholarly commentary widely assumes that certain innovation
markets- especially multicomponent markets such as biotechnology, software,
and information technology- suffer from thickets of overlapping property
rights that restrain and encumber research and development activities, thereby
slowing, rather than promoting, innovative output. But this often-repeated
statement loses considerable force given that empirical inquiries to identify
patent thickets or related "anticommons" effects in these markets have so far
failed to confirm or reject any inhibitory effect on innovation activity. ' 03
103. See David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 2o BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 985, 989-9o (2005) (observing that "anticommons" and related critiques of
biotechnology patents are grounded in isolated anecdotes and have not been confirmed by
empirical studies); Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human
Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NAT. BIOTECH. 1091, 1093 (20o6) (same); Smart J.H.














Moreover, these indeterminate (if still preliminary) findings are consistent
with the broad sweep of intellectual property history: unambiguous cases of
"IP bottlenecks" are few, whereas transactional solutions that solve or preempt
actual or potential bottlenecks are abundantly documented. °4 These solutions
extend across an impressively broad range of periods and markets, each of
which engineers a customized transactional landscape where the surrounding
property regime is formally unchanged but is displaced in part by embedded
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 45, 73 (Robert
W. Hahn ed., 2005) (noting that "contentions that increased software patenting somehow
'causes' declines in R & D investment remain unproven") (internal citation omitted); F.
Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith's
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101 (2007),
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/593.pdf (noting the lack of supporting empirical
evidence for the anticommons concept). A number of underlying studies have examined the
biotechnology sector. See David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The
Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1677, 168o (2007)
(finding "little evidence that the recent growth in biotechnology patenting is threatening
innovation" based on dataset of 52,ooo biotechnology patents from January 1990 through
December 2004); John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool
Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY 285 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (finding that, in a sample
of seventy interviews, patents on inputs to drug discovery generally have not halted research
projects due to potentially conflicting patent claims held by other parties, although there is
evidence of some delays in negotiating access to research tools or other valuable information
or methodologies); Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights
Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11465, 2005) (hypothesizing that
anticommons effects would predict a lower citation rate for papers that contained ideas that
were subsequently patented and finding evidence of a modest effect). For some studies in
the software sector, see John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of Software
Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 297 (2007), which finds that software patents vary in quality
and value and as a group appear to be of higher quality and value than the average patent,
based on a dataset of 20,000 computer industry patents; Robert P. Merges, Software and
Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1627, 1628 (2007), which finds
that previously expressed concerns that patent protection would discourage software
innovation have been contradicted by continuing robust industry performance; and Robert
P. Merges, Patents, Entry and Growth in the Software Industry (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Sch. of
Law Working Paper, 2007), which finds that patent effort by incumbent software firms
correlates closely with indicators of market success and that entry rates in the software
industry have not declined as patentability has increased.
104. Professor Robert Merges has provided some of the leading scholarship for both parts of this
statement. See Merges, supra note 61 (documenting transactional solutions whereby private
parties lower the costs of licensing and enforcing large pools of intellectual property rights);
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 839 (1990) (documenting cases where patent disputes apparently delayed
development of early aircraft and radio technologies and describing some industry-
generated solutions).
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cooperative arrangements that pool knowledge assets among various firms,
thereby effectively lifting property rights protections among the participant
group and preserving in part the low transaction cost structure of a sharing
regime. Historical and contemporary arrangements include: tens of patent
pools that covered a large number of manufacturing industries in the pre-
World War II era;' 5 thousands of strategic alliances and knowledge-
cooperative arrangements in the biotechnology industry between private firms
and academic or other not-for-profit entities, including the formation of public
or quasipublic databases for biological and genetic materials that are freely or
substantially accessible to a large pool of academic and commercial users (for
example, Merck Gene Index, SNP Consortium, and GenBank) ;,o6 widespread
cross-licensing, constrained enforcement, and, more recently, research and
development consortia that characterize the semiconductor industry; 1 7 and
patent-pooling arrangements in the consumer electronics and
telecommunications industries, including the "MPEG LA" pools that cover
patents relating to essential data-compression and other technology standards,
involve hundreds of patent holders and thousands of patents, and cover
hundreds of millions of dollars in worldwide sales.1,
8
105. See Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent
Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR
THE KNOWLEDGE SoCIETY, supra note 2, at 123, 135-39; Merges, supra note 61, at 1342-52.
1o6. For a comprehensive review of these knowledge-cooperative arrangements, see Nadine
Roijakkers & John Hagedoom, Inter-Firm R&D Partnering in Pharmaceutical Biotechnology
Since 1975: Trends, Patterns, and Networks, 35 RES. POL'Y 431 (20o6). For data on strategic
alliances and similar arrangements in biotechnology, see David B. Audretsch & Maryann P.
Feldman, Small-Firm Strategic Research Partnerships: The Case of Biotechnology, 15 TECH.
ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT. 273 (2003). For additional discussion of cooperative
arrangements in the biotechnology sector, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic
Commons: Imperfect Patent Protection and the Network Model of Innovation, 37 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 987, 1015-21 (2000); Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based
Regulation, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 915-16 (2009); and Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in
the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 186-91 (2004).
107. For extensive discussion, see infra Section III.B.
1o8. See information found at MPEG LA Website, http://www.mpegla.com (last visited Sept. 5,
2009). For further discussion, see DAVID J. TEECE, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL:
ORGANIZATIONAL, STRATEGIC, AND POLICY DIMENSIONS 194-98 (2000); and Anne Layne-
Farrar & Josh Lerner, To Join or Not To Join: Examining Patent Pool Participation and Rent
Sharing Rules (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,06), 'J09), available
at http://papers.ssrn.con-/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=945189. I note that some "MPEG"
pools operate as simple cost-effective solutions to licensing large pools of patents, akin to
the performance-rights licensing organizations in the content industries (for example, BMI
and ASCAP), which does not alter the formal propertization outcome; however, others
appear to permit access to standard technologies by competitors for purposes of facilitating
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The impressive diffusion and variety of cooperative solutions to excessive
propertization outcomes, and the resulting effective recalibration of state
allocated legal entitlements, broadly track the limited optimism of the STMP
thesis: an adversely affected innovation market that does not suffer from high
coordination costs or a skewed propertization bias is unlikely to be stuck with
an excessive property regime it does not want or need. This qualified optimism
in the self-correction capacities of certain innovation markets relies on a
straightforward profit-maximization principle: subject to coordination cost
obstacles, any transaction cost inefficiency as a result of excessive propertization
inherently induces rational investments by adversely affected innovators to accrue the
gains from correcting it. Even in the otherwise adverse case where no individual
firm has sufficient interest or resources to undertake corrective action to scale
back an excessive propertization outcome, third-party intermediaries may have
a rational profit incentive to do so (something which has occurred in the case of
the long-established American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
(ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) organizations in the music industry
and the newly formed "MPEG LA" patent pools in the consumer electronics
industry). Following this guardedly optimistic view, even complex innovation
markets that are inherently susceptible to a property trap that entrenches
unneeded intellectual property protections will rationally engage in some
meaningful level of mutually beneficial Coasean bargaining, which in turn
yields cooperative mechanisms that trade off innovation gains against
transaction costs and associated losses. These cooperative arrangements are
fully consistent with the underlying social cost-benefit rationale that lies
behind the Demsetz model of rights formation (and the Coasean model of
rights reallocation), but working in reverse109: competing firms partially
abandon or otherwise constrain a property regime in order to enter into
product development, which does diverge materially from formally allocated entitlements.
For detailed discussion, see Layne-Farrar & Lerner, supra.
iog. For discussions of a similar reversal in the classic sequence anticipated by Demsetz, see
Merges, supra note io6, at 200-01, which argues that "property-preempting investments" in
software, biotechnology, and cultural markets appear to reverse Demsetz's proposed
correlation between an increase in property values and an increase in property rights, insofar
as increases in the value of the relevant asset class apparently trigger voluntary
abandonment of property rights. Note that, whereas Merges primarily attributes the
voluntary abandonment of property rights for competitive advantage to an increase in the
value of the underlying asset, id., I attribute this phenomenon entirely to an increase in the
transaction costs of sustaining participation in the property regime relative to the innovation
gains that could be accrued by abandoning the regime. That is consistent with the Demsetz
thesis, which provides that property rights will increase as a function of increasing value,
subject to the administration and enforcement costs of doing so. See supra notes 48-49 and
accompanying text.
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mutually beneficial arrangements that generate collective gains in the form of
reduced transaction costs and associated innovation gains.
C. Why "Too Much" Property Often Does Not Last
The STMP thesis-and, in particular, the expectation that individually
rational innovators will sometimes take actions to adjust collectively irrational
propertization outcomes -directly anticipates a real-world scenario of
substantial importance largely overlooked by the intellectual property
literature: large resource holders actively and successfully resist the imposition
of novel intellectual property protections, actively lobby for the withdrawal,
reversal, or dilution of intellectual property protections, and, most strikingly,
regularly forfeit large pools of knowledge assets to the public domain. The
essential reason behind this otherwise curious behavior is simple: large
resource holders do not simply seek to maximize initial innovation gains, as
various versions of the ATMP thesis assume or imply; rather, they self-
interestedly seek to maximize the cumulative stream of initial plus subsequent
innovation gains, net of transaction costs, as the STMP thesis correctly observes.110
Assume that a large firm is a repeat player that tends to stand on both sides of
intellectual property transactions and litigations with roughly equal
frequency... (or more precisely, tends over time to have roughly equal
i1o. This is not the exclusive motivation for giving away knowledge assets that are, or could be,
protected by patents or other entitlements. Most obviously, firms may forfeit patentable
assets in order to preempt competitors from patenting those assets, for which "vanity
journals" are used in order to establish a prior art record. Some scholars have argued that
firms will prefer to "give away" private technology in order to induce follow-on innovation
that increases the value of the original innovation. See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Value of GivingAway Secrets, 89 VA. L. REv. 1857 (2003) (describing the
increasing tendency among firms to publish, rather than patent, valuable private knowledge,
which is attributed to a rational interest in credibly committing to share surplus with
follow-on innovators). In the fashion context, I and co-authors have argued that luxury
apparel firms prefer incomplete protections against third-party imitation-that is, to
effectively "give away" a portion of any season's revenues on a winning product -in order to
accrue "runner-up" awards in other seasons where the firm misjudges the winning style
outcome. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Gilles Grolleau & Sana El Harbi, The Fashion Lottery:
Cooperative Innovation in Stochastic Markets, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2010).
iii. This assumption has empirical grounding. Based on a dataset of U.S. public firms involved
in 20,522 patent lawsuits during the period 1987-1999, Professors James Bessen and Michael
Meurer have estimated that the hazard of being an alleged patent infringer has been slightly
less than being a patent litigant (where hazard is calculated as the sample mean rate of
litigation per firm divided by the sample mean deflated R&D expenditure). See James
Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion 17-18 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law
Working Paper Series, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 05-18, 2005),
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economic values at stake as, respectively, seller/plaintiff or buyer/defendant). It
will then rationally assign roughly equal weight to each component of the net
social product generated by intellectual production- innovation gains and
transaction cost losses attendant to increased propertization -which, in turn,
implies that it will demand property rights approximately at a level that mimics
the social interest in maximizing the social product yielded by innovation
investment. Contrary to natural intuitions, it may therefore be the case that the
largest resource holders will tend to have the strongest incentives to relax
intellectual property protections where incremental transaction costs and
associated innovation losses race ahead of incremental innovation gains,
thereby self-interestedly acting to expand the public domain in at least partial
consistency with the social interest. Further challenging natural intuitions (and
setting aside distributive considerations), this implies in turn that individual
end users and individual inventors will tend to have the weakest incentives to
demand socially compatible levels of intellectual property protections. End
users will demand too little property (by underweighting initial innovation
gains and overweighting transaction costs) while individual inventors will
demand too much property (by overweighting initial gains and
underweighting transaction costs and associated innovation losses), especially
(as may typically be the case) if these firms or individuals are not repeat
players."'
http://ssrn.com/abstract=831685. Importantly, these data show that a public firm's risk of
being an alleged patent infringer (measured relative to R&D spending) has risen sharply
during the subject period (a seventy percent increase), id. at 18, which would in turn be
consistent with the fact that (as I discuss shortly) these firms (in some industries) are the
principal proponents behind proposed reforms to relax patent protections. Note that if
hazard is measured alternatively as the rate of litigation per patent, then the hazard rate does
not change significantly during the subject period in general and behaves differently in
different industries. See id. at 33.
112. It should be noted that the "propertization bias" of individual inventors and small firms may
have some countervailing efficiency benefits, to the extent that either (i) small firms are
uniquely situated to generate certain types of innovations, or (ii) large firms have
differential access to substitutes for intellectual property (in which case, reducing intellectual
property protection necessarily protects incumbents against entry). For further discussion,
see Jonathan M. Barnett, Is Intellectual Property Trivial?, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1691, 1726-29,
1736-37 (2009); and Barnett, supra note 44, at 1285-98. That in turn raises the broader
question (outside the immediate scope of this Article) of whether "second-best"
considerations would sometimes recommend some level of "excessive" propertization in
order to offset the inefficiencies resulting from the concentrated market conditions that
otherwise facilitate private-market efforts to reduce the transaction cost losses attendant to
an actively deployed property regime. Put differently: we may face an inherent choice
between (i) a heavily propertized market with high transaction costs and associated losses
but lower barriers for small-firm entry, and (ii) a lightly propertized market with low
transaction costs and associated losses but higher barriers for small-firm entry.
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The surprising proposition that large firms may sometimes act as the
strongest bulwark against too much property accounts not only for the
widespread distribution of knowledge sharing arrangements among direct
competitors in technology markets but also for even bolder and more curious
varieties of rational forfeiture of knowledge assets. Self-interested efforts by
large firms to reduce transaction costs (and thereby accrue resulting innovation
gains) can account for the surprisingly widespread practice whereby firms with
rich innovation portfolios make substantial giveaways of knowledge assets,
tolerate infringement, and advocate relaxed forms of intellectual property
protection (which is functionally equivalent to forfeiting exclusivity over some
existing and future pool of knowledge assets). Consider, in chronological
order:
(1) The Automotive Technology Giveaway. Starting in 1911, virtually all
U.S. automobile manufacturers automatically cross-licensed
patented technologies at a zero royalty rate. In 1938, Ford Motor
Company reported that it offered its patents to "any applicant" at no
charge and declined as a matter of policy to bring enforcement
actions even against parties that used its technology without
obtaining the zero-royalty license.1.3 Similar policies have continued
in the automotive industry formally and informally through the
present day'14 (as indicated in part by its relatively low incidence of
patent litigation"').
(2) The AT&T/Bell Labs Giveaway. Starting in 1952, AT&T made
available to all applicants its transistor and related patents at low
royalty rates of o to 2% of sales (subject to a cross-license obligation
in some cases), which provided the foundation for the
semiconductor industry. The policy was rendered mandatory by a
government consent decree in 1956; however, AT&T reportedly
113. See Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: Hearings Before the Temporary National
Economic Comm., 75th Cong. 257-58 (1938) (testimony of Edsel Ford, President, Ford Motor
Co., and testimony of I. Joseph Farley, Patent Counsel, Ford Motor Co.) [hereinafter Ford
Testimony].
114. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 104, at 890 (noting the current practice in the automotive
industry of "relatively automatic cross licensing" of patents).
uS. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 446, 472 (2004) (finding that
patents in automotive, semiconductor, and chemicals industries are litigated less frequently




exceeded the decree's requirements in its efforts to disseminate
transistor technology and related know-how to licensees.",
6
(3) The IBM Know-How Giveaway. From 1958 through 1998, IBM,
through its Technical Disclosure Bulletin, released substantial
know-how concerning unpatented technical improvements that it
had developed, which in turn have been cited as prior art in 48,000
patent applications.
1 7
(4) The Corporate Research Giveaway. Technology firms contribute to the
public domain large amounts of valuable knowledge, either in
scientific journals or in vanity trade journals established precisely for
this purpose and distributed among research laboratories." 8
Between 1991 and 2000, IBM and AT&T were the first and second
most prolific publishers of papers in computer science, AT&T was
the most prolific publisher of papers in physics, and IBM was one of
the five most prolific publishers of papers in physics." 9
(5) The Financial Information Giveaway. The Bloomberg Corporation,
one of the world's leading providers of data to the financial markets,
has vigorously (and successfully) resisted the imposition of
intellectual property protection 2° precisely because it is a heavy user
of informational inputs and rationally anticipates that enhanced
propertization would be unlikely to generate internalization gains in
excess of internalization costs.
(6) The Information Technology Giveaway. In the information technology
markets, major firms regularly contribute patented technology to
industry standard-setting organizations, which then take ownership
116. See Richard C. Levin, The Semiconductor Industry, in GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL
PROGRESS: A CRoss-INDusTRY ANALYSIS 9, 76-77 (Richard R: Nelson ed., 1982).
117. See Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race, 48 J.L. &
ECON. 173 (2005).
118. See TEECE, supra note io8, app. A., § A.3.3; Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 11o, at
1857-58.
11g. See Julien P~nin, Open Knowledge Disclosure: An Overview of the Evidence and Economic
Motivations, 21 J. EcoN. SuRvs. 326, 329 (2007) (citing a survey by Science Watch). In 1991,
industry researchers were responsible for one-sixth of the scientific and technical literature in
chemistry and physics and one-fourth of the scientific and technical literature in engineering
and technology. See Paula E. Stephan, The Economics of Science, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 1199, 1210-11
(1996).
120. See Database and Collections of Information Misappropriations: Joint Hearing on H.R. 3261
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, io8th Cong. 50 (2003) (statement of Thomas J. Donohue, President
and Chief Executive Officer, Chamber of Commerce).
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of the technology or require that the contributing firm license the
technology to organization members on a royalty-free or
"reasonable and nondiscriminatory" basis (and sometimes even
compels licensing to nonmembers that use the standard).'
21
(7) The Biotech Giveaway. Following the advent of case law that
strengthened patent protection for certain genetic material1 2  and
the subsequent exploitation of these rights in the biotechnology
industry, large pharmaceutical companies have sponsored the
creation of public access databases for certain genetic and other
biological material. For example, Merck & Co. has sponsored, in
collaboration with Washington University, the Merck Gene Index
for expressed gene sequence tags, and thirteen major pharmaceutical
companies have sponsored the SNP Consortium, which provides
private funding for a project dedicated to developing a "next-
generation" map of the human genome in coordination with various
government health ministries and academic research institutes.
12 3
(8) The Proprietary Software Giveaway. In 2005, IBM, Sun, and Nokia
issued pledges not to enforce their patents against open source
software developers.' 4 In the same year, IBM and other major
technology companies agreed with leading universities on
121. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL.
L. REv. 1889, 1904-o6 (2002) (reviewing rules and bylaws adopted by dozens of standard
setting organizations, mostly in the computer networking and telecommunications
industries, with respect to ownership and licensing of patents and other intellectual property
rights contributed to those organizations).
122. For leading decisions, see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), which upheld a
patent on a genetically engineered microorganism; and Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical
Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991), which upheld a patent on purified and isolated DNA
sequence encoding a red blood cell-stimulating protein.
123. For information on the SNP Consortium, see About the International HapMap Project,
http://snp.cshl.org/abouthapmap.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2009); and SNP Fact Sheet,
http ://www.ornl.gov/scVtechresources/HumanGenome/faq/snps.shtml#whoare
(last visited Sept. 5, 2009). For information on the Merck Gene Index, see Press Release,
Merck & Co., First Installment of Merck Index Data Released to Public Databases (Feb. lo,
1995), http://www.bio.net/bionet/mn/bionews/1995-February/oo1794.html. For further
description of these arrangements, see Lee, supra note 1o6, at 905, 915-16; and Merges, supra
note io6, at 187-88.
124. See Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?,
20 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 29 (2006).
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guidelines to permit the free availability of software developed in
"precompetitive" industry-academic collaborative projects. 2 '
(9) The Open-Source Software Giveaway. In the open-source software
market, where applications are released largely without copyright
protections against third-party usage and distribution (subject to
certain contractual restrictions), substantial funding (roughly
estimated at $1 billion per year) and hundreds of technical staff are
now supplied by proprietary software firms. Some of these firms are
participants in the Open Invention Network, a nonprofit entity that
patents, or acquires patents to, open-source technologies and then
contributes them into an open access innovation pool.2 6
Consistent with this historical pattern of voluntary forfeitures by large
holders of knowledge assets, the country's leading information technology and
financial services firms, acting through a trade group known as the Coalition
for Patent Fairness," 7 are now pushing for patent reforms that would increase
the difficulty in obtaining patents, reduce the difficulty in contesting patents,
and lower the damages for which infringers are liable."28 These "publicly
interested" efforts to constrain intellectual property protection jar with the
familiar observation of rent-seeking actions by large-firm incumbents to push
through socially excessive levels of intellectual property protection and enclose
the public domain, all of which is purported to operate consistently to the
public detriment while enriching the pockets of the relevant corporate treasury.
Such cases certainly exist and have been documented in extensive detail.12 9
Indeed, these pathological cases are fully anticipated by the theoretical
125. See Steve Lohr, Guidelines Set on Software Property Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at C6;
IBM University Relations, http://www.ibm.com/university (last visited Sept. 5 2009).
126. See Mann, supra note 124, at 20, 31 n.129. For extensive discussion, see Barnett, supra note
38, at 57-69. For further discussion of the Open Invention Network, see infra note 144 and
accompanying text.
127. For more detailed information, see Coalition for Patent Fairness, http://
www.patentfairness.org (last visited Sept. S 2009).
128. See supra note 92. The reforms are opposed by individual inventors and venture capitalist
investors that commonly invest in small firms as well as, most adamantly, the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.
129. On standard accounts of the political economy of copyright and patent law, see supra note
59. On the political economy of trademark law, see Clarisa Long, The Political Economy of
Trademark Dilution, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 132 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008), which documents that
large corporate interests supported legislative expansion of trademark law to cover dilution
claims, but federal courts constrained the reach of those expansions and these court
decisions were only partially reversed by legislative amendments.
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discussion above, which contemplates a strong propertization bias in the case
of highly integrated entities that make little use of outside sources to access
required inputs. It may therefore be no accident that some of the most vigorous
articulations of the too much property thesis are advanced with respect to the
entertainment and other content-dependent industries, where there is a
reasonable case that the most dominant firms have rich copyright estates that
necessitate little recourse to outside sources for creative inputs, thereby
implying a skewed bias in favor of excessive propertization levels,1 30 and
adversely affected groups tend to be highly dispersed, thereby implying a weak
ability to undertake any corrective action. The extent to which the
entertainment industry as a whole exhibits a skewed propertization bias, and
the extent to which adversely affected groups-which broadly include users,
(some) creators, hardware manufacturers, and distribution intermediaries-
have capacities to correct excessive propertization outcomes, both through legal
and extralegal strategies, are open and complex empirical questions deserving
of further inquiry.'31
130. There may be other reasons why, relative to other industries, entertainment firms are both
more sensitive to the innovation gains and less sensitive to the transaction costs attendant to
increased intellectual property rights. First, these firms generally operate in a capital-
intensive "hits market," which implies especially high requirements for copyright protection
given a large "appropriability gap" between creation costs (which must take into account the
costs of creation across the large number of failed projects) and imitation costs, which can
be close to negligible depending on the quality of then-existing reproduction technologies.
Second, while these firms produce multi-component products akin to the information
technology sector, firms can limit exposure to the transaction costs of a property rights
system through (i) "work for hire" contracts (which preempt copyright infringement and
"joint works" claims by freelance contributors); (ii) "errors and omissions" insurance
against copyright infringement suits; and (iii) regular refusal to review unsolicited
submissions (which protects against copyright infringement and common-law
misappropriation claims). These are all standard practices at Hollywood studios. Interview
with David Fierson, Senior Vice President, Alcon Entm't, in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 20, 2009). On
studios' reluctance to review unsolicited manuscripts, see Igor Dubinsky, The Race to the Box
Office Leads to Cinematic Dja Vu: Modifying Copyright Laiv To Minimize Rent Dissipation and
Copyright Redundancy at the Movies, 29 WHiTrIER L. REV. 405, 411 (2007).
131. Note that the conventional view assumes that adversely affected populations in
entertainment and other content markets lack any feasible means by which to influence
propertization outcomes or otherwise reduce transaction cost burdens (which in turn would
support the standard normative view that copyright persists at excessive levels in these
markets). Some preliminary observations suggest a murkier picture. Consider: (i) users can
influence propertization outcomes by mass infringement and through conventional
lobbying by collective organizations such as library associations and higher education
institutions; (ii) hardware manufacturers can influence propertization outcomes by selling
devices that lower the costs of user infringement; and (iii) distribution intermediaries can
influence propertization outcomes by taking greater or lesser precautions against user
infringement. Moreover, individual creators exercise leverage in the movie and television
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What is quite certain, however, is that a large number of economically
critical markets -including the information technology, software, database,
financial services, and biotechnology markets-are not always pathological.
Specifically, large firms in these markets have periodically made impressive
undertakings to limit the coverage and strength of formal intellectual property
rights and have done so precisely in newly propertized innovation markets that
are widely claimed to suffer from too much property.
Following the one-sided view of the ATMP thesis, and the distributive
critique that presumptively casts doubt on most (if not all) propertization
outcomes, these recurrent attempts by large resource holders (often
necessitating substantial dollar investments) to cut back intellectual property
coverage are difficult to explain. Why would IBM, the world's largest patent
holder with over $i billion a year in royalty income from its patent portfolio,'32
consistently lobby to secure legislative and judicial actions (including
repeatedly filing briefs in recent Supreme Court and Federal Circuit patent
cases in favor of relaxed patent protections'33) that would limit its ability to
obtain and defend patents and thereby reduce the value of its portfolio and
associated licensing income? Why would Apple, Cisco Systems, Hewlett
Packard, Intel, and Microsoft (just to name a few) all do roughly the same?
industries through trade guilds, and collective clearance organizations have largely solved
transaction cost obstacles in performance rights over recorded musical works through
associations such as BMI and ASCAP. See Merges, supra note 61, at 1328-40. More recently,
some individual creators have adjusted propertization outcomes to a limited extent through
"Creative Commons" licenses that waive certain copyright protections. In short, there is a
rich mix of constituencies and strategies that imply a complex balance of power, which,
without further analysis, may not immediately support the standard inference of excessive
propertization.
132. See Brian Bergstein, IBM Filing Seeks Patent for Patent-Licensing Process, Hous. CHRON., Oct.
24, 2007, at 7.
133. See Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. in Support of Neither
Party, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350) (arguing against
the Federal Circuit's standard for determining non-obviousness and in favor of a standard
that would make it easier for PTO to reject combination patent applications); Brief of
International Business Machines Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs, Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 04-607) (arguing
in favor of bolstering the "useful application" requirement that would probably bar purely
nontechnical business-method patents); Brief of International Business Machines Corp. as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388 (2006) (No. 05-130) (arguing against the Federal Circuit's automatic standards for
permanent injunctions and in favor of traditional standards that permit greater use of
equitable discretion); Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. in
Support of Neither Party, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 20o8) (No. 2007-1130) (urging
the Federal Circuit to narrow standard of patentability under State Street so as to exclude
abstract nontechnological methods).
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Each of these firms individually holds thousands of patents but files, or
participates in industry associations T3 that regularly file, amicus briefs
recommending outcomes that would relax patent protections'35 and, as noted
above, actively lobbies for currently pending reforms that would generally
make it harder to obtain patents, easier to contest patents, and lower damages
for patent infringement. '
Failure to explain what facially appear to be irrational giveaways of
substantial proportions is a major shortcoming. This explains why
conventional intellectual property commentary sometimes misinterprets pro-
reform lobbying actions by the high technology industry as a "surprising"
turnaround in strategy. Not at all. This IP-resistant strategy is consistent with
past positions taken by large firms in cumulative innovation markets. In 1938,
the CEO of Ford Motor Company, together with his legal counsel, testified
before a U.S. Senate committee in support of proposed reforms that would
increase the difficulty of obtaining and renewing patents, a position fully
consistent with Ford's then publicly stated policy of open licensing and
nonenforcement of patents. Ford and its automotive peers in the 193os and
IBM and its information technology peers today are far from non sequiturs.
These voluntary truncations and forfeitures of property rights protections recur
periodically as innovator populations recalibrate runaway propertization
outcomes from time to time. Today the IP resistance of large incumbents in
134. These trade and lobbying groups include most notably the Business Software Alliance, the
Software and Information Industry Association, the Computer and Communications
Industry Assocation, and, as noted earlier, the Coalition for Patent Fairness. For further
information, see Business Software Alliance, http://www.bsa.org (last visited Sept. 5,
2009); Coalition for Patent Fairness, http://www.patentfairness.org (last visited Sept. 5,
2009); Computer & Communications Industry Association, http://www.ccianet.org (last
visited Sept. 5, 2009); and Software & Information Industry Assocation,
http://www.siia.net (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
135. See supra note 96 and infra notes 140-142. For other examples in the widely followed
litigation of KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), see Brief for Amicus
Curiae Computer & Communications Industry Ass'n in Support of Petitioner, Teleflex, 550
U.S. 398 (No. 04-1350), which urges the Court to adopt a standard that would make it
easier for the defendant to contest the nonobviousness of a patent; Brief of the Business
Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (No. 04-
1350), which urges the same; and Brief of Intel Corp. and Micron Technology, Inc. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (No. 04-135o), which urges the same.
136. See supra note 128. On the involvement of the information technology industry in the
lobbying process, see Kim Hart, Patent Reform Bill Introduced in Congress Today,
WAsH. POST, Mar. 3, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2oo9/o3/
patent-reform bill introduced.html.
137. See Ford Testimony, supra note 113, at 282.
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technology-based industries is targeted most vigorously at patent holding
companies (known pejoratively as "trolls"), which are widely portrayed as
acquiring patents for the purpose of extracting hold-up payouts from cash-rich
firms faced with the threat of a shutdown injunction and treble damages in the
case of an adverse judgment."38 Consistent with the STMP thesis, these firms
have invested efforts in lobbying for legislative reforms to the patent statute'39
and, as noted above, filing amicus briefs in a recent series of high-profile patent
litigations, in each case advancing positions that limit a patent holder's ability
to prevail and/or win damages in an infringement suit. Those litigations have
resulted in decisions that advance this objective considerably, most notably
making it much harder for a nonpracticing patent holder to obtain injunctive
relief even after a finding of validity and infringement (thereby neutralizing the
shutdown threat),14° making it easier to contest the validity of a patent on
obviousness grounds,' 4' and making it harder for a patent holder to show
138. This phenomenon is most vividly illustrated by the 2oo6 settlement concerning the
Blackberry device, where Research In Motion Ltd. settled an infringement claim for $612.5
million in the face of a threatened injunction that would have shut down the Blackberry
system. See Associated Press, Settlement Reached in Blackberry Patent Case, MSNBC, Mar. 3,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.con1/id/116593o4. Empirical results are complex as to the
extent to which non-practicing patent holders actually drive patent litigation, which appears
to vary considerably across technology and patent characteristics. See John R. Allison, Mark
A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-
Litigated Patents, 25 fig.2, 26 tbl.5A (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 1407796, 2009),
http://ssrn.conabstract=14o7796. For policy-oriented commentary on the patent troll
issue, see John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007);
and Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991 (2007). Note that I am not expressing any view as to whether the conventional
portrayal of patent holding companies is an accurate characterization of these entities, at
least in the typical case.
139. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
140. I am referring both to (i) the Supreme Court's decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.,
547 U.S. 388 (20o6), which held that a permanent injunction cannot automatically issue
against a defendant following a finding of validity and infringement (rather, it is subject to a
multifactor balancing test); and (ii) the lower court case law that has subsequently applied
eBay such that direct competitors are almost always entitled to an injunction following a
finding of validity and infringement whereas indirect competitors are almost always not so
entitled. See Golden, supra note 138, at 2113-14. The Business Software Alliance filed a brief
in the landmark Supreme Court case of eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., successfully
arguing against the Federal Circuit's "automatic" injunction standard in patent infringement
cases. See Brief of Business Software Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130).
141. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (instructing that the stringent
teaching-suggestion-motivation test established by the Federal Circuit for showing
obviousness was too rigid, and that courts should interpret evidence holistically to
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willful infringement (which would entitle it to treble damages) .142 As a minor
complement to these lobbying efforts, large firms have formed nascent
transactional arrangements intended to protect against the "patent troll"
threat; as noted previously, 43 a consortium of leading technology companies
has launched the Open Invention Network, which seeks to acquire a portfolio
of critical patents to be made available at no cost to any firm that agrees not to
assert its patents against Linux open source software developers. '44
The STMP thesis fully anticipates these strategic actions by dominant IP-
rich firms to roll back intellectual property protections in the face of third
parties' idiosyncratic adoption and enforcement practices: long-term industry
players rationally seek to constrain property rights protections in order to
maximize the cumulative stream of innovation gains net of transaction costs.
To achieve this objective, these firms undertake lobbying, adoption, and/or
enforcement actions. They also form various transactional arrangements,
determine whether or not the subject matter of a patent was obvious, taking into account
existing knowledge together with technological developments and market demand in the
relevant field).
142. See In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F. 3d 136o (Fed. Cir. 2007) (enhancing the standard by
which patentholder must establish objective recklessness in order to show willful
infringement, which triggers treble damages). The Business Software Alliance filed a brief
urging the court to reverse the lower court's ruling that failure to seek opinion of counsel
with respect to likelihood of infringement can support a finding of willful infringement. See
Brief for the Business Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant
Qualcomm Inc. and Supporting the Petition for Rehearing En Banc 1-2, Broadcom Corp. v.
Qualcomm, Inc., 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 20o8-1199, -1271, -1272), available at
http://www.appellate.net/briefs/BSABrieffinal.pdf (last visited Sept. 5,2009).
143. See supra note 126.
144. See Roger Parloff, A No-Fly Zone To Protect Linux from Patent Trolls, CNNMoney,
Dec. 8, 20o8, http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/oo8/12/o8/a-no-fly-zone-to-protect
-linux-from-patent-trolls. Members include IBM, Novell, NEC, Philips and Sony. Fifty
companies have entered into reciprocity agreements with the Open Invention Network,
including Oracle and Google. For further information, see Open Invention Network,
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2009). Nascent transactional
solutions may also emerge from outside the affected population of patent holders. Most
recently, the RPX Corporation, a for-profit firm, has acquired a portfolio of critical patents,
which it promises not to litigate and licenses on a fixed fee basis to subscribing firms that
wish to retire potentially harmful patents. See Complete Alignment of Interests Between
RPX and Its Members, http://www.rpxcorp.com/svc howitworks.html (last visited Sept. 5,
2009). Existing licensees include IBM, LG, Cisco, Philips, and Samsung. See Press Release,
RPX Corporation, Eleven Technology Companies Join RPX in First Five Months
(Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.rpxcorp.conVreleases/current/pro9o331_customers.html.
The company states that it owns over 270 patents with an "acquisition value" of $97.6




subject to the coordination cost constraints and political "noise" that
sometimes prevent realization of socially preferred propertization outcomes.
The constrained optimism of the STMP thesis, which envisions imperfect
Coasean bargaining in the political and commercial marketplace subject to
coordination cost constraints (rather than the unconstrained pessimism of the
ATMP thesis, which assumes uniformly high coordination costs and therefore
rules out Coasean outcomes, or the unconstrained optimism of the NTMP
thesis, which assumes uniformly low coordination costs and therefore
universally assumes Coasean outcomes) is apparently often (if only partially)
satisfied in practice.
III.REGIME SELECTION IN PRACTICE
Whether or not the process-based approach to propertization outcomes is a
useful analytical construct will ultimately be determined in its sustained
application to particular innovation markets, which will in turn yield a finer
grained understanding of the ability (or inability) of adversely affected
innovator populations to scale back excessive propertization outcomes. In this
Part, I preliminarily apply this approach for the purpose of illustrating its
potential explanatory power as a positive account of regime selection in
innovation markets. First, I exploit the interaction between property trap
effects and truncation actions to yield a general regime template that sketches a
partially deterministic pattern consisting of an initial rush to propertization.
This initial rush is then followed by self-correction actions, which are
respectively aggravated and promoted principally as a function of coordination
cost conditions and propertization biases among the dominant innovator
population. Second, on the basis of this template, I describe a unique regime
path for the semiconductor market, which has the useful characteristic that, in
the course of several decades, it has traveled along virtually the full length of
the extended regime path, which uniquely illustrates incumbents' capacity to
recalibrate propertization outcomes in order to defend against imitation threats
(which demand more property), and lower transaction cost burdens (which
demand less property), both of which endanger long-term maximization of net
gains from innovation investments.
A. Regime Template
The standard narrative of intellectual property expansionism assumes a
discrete one-way jump from a pristine "state of nature" commons to a state
imposed property regime, which is then situated within a rigid framework
where large resource holders consistently deploy disproportionate lobbying
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and enforcement resources to promote increased propertization subject only to
budget constraints, presumably at the expense of small innovators, individual
end users, and the social interest more generally.1 4' By this stage, it should be
clear that this story is naive insofar as it overlooks (among other things) the
demonstrated possibility that even-or, most strikingly, especially and only-
large resource holders will rationally decline to seek and will even resist
expansions in intellectual property coverage if this generates anticipated
transaction costs and associated innovation losses in excess of anticipated
innovation gains. So long as we do not exclude the possibility that increasing
transaction costs, and resulting innovation losses, may overwhelm innovation
gains from increased propertization (which must hold true in some single
instance for any formulation of the too much property thesis to have any
practical relevance), a far more complex narrative emerges. Innovator
populations continuously pursue the cumulative stream of net innovation
returns by allocating resources to lobbying, adoption, and enforcement actions,
as well as the formation and maintenance of cooperative arrangements, which
in turn generate a variety of possible movements along a graduated regime
path that is reversible, consists of multiple stages, and travels over a range of
commons, property, and sharing regimes (including truncated and other
hybrid property regimes).
The Figure below provides a graphical illustration of these various regime
types and some of the possible movements between, from, and to each type.
Starting with a sharing regime that sustains innovation through extralegal
appropriation mechanisms, the innovator population is driven by idiosyncratic
actions or some other triggering event toward a state-provided property
regime, which may then immediately or ultimately take several alternative
forms. These include: (i) a fully deployed property regime; (ii) a directly
truncated property regime where any legal protections are mostly a dead letter
(as noted earlier, a not-uncommon occurrence4 6) and a sharing regime
effectively persists as the dominant governance structure; or (iii) an indirectly
truncated property regime, where the dominant property regime has some
145. Some intellectual property commentators take the view that strong intellectual property
protections hurt both end users and small innovators. That is usually internally
contradictory: the former are "net users" who rationally favor weak protections while the
latter are usually "net producers" who rationally favor strong protections. Not
coincidentally, the same mistaken identification of consumer and small producer interests
led to persistent errors in antitrust commentary and jurisprudence over several decades. For
extensive discussion of this point, see BoRK, supra note 6.
146. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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meaningful force but is substantially displaced by embedded cooperative











These generic movements among regime types are consistent with the
handful of existing discussions of evolutionary tendencies in intellectual
property law, which envision alternating periods of underprotection and
overprotection in response to external technological developments and
exaggerated legal responses.' In contrast to these approaches, however, this
147. Consistent with prior Figures, increasingly dark coloration indicates increasing
propertization, and vice versa.
148. See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of
Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 34-41, 47-59 (2004) (arguing that legal
evolution in intellectual property regimes follows a multi-stage path consisting of a
technological jump, which then prompts overprotection as sought by producers who claim
underprotection under the now outdated existing regime, which in turn prompts corrective
lobbying by adversely affected users who use "outlier" applications of the new regime to
argue for limits on purportedly excessive protections); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred
Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2ooo, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187, 2190 (2000)
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model links the historical ebbs and flows in intellectual property coverage with
an underlying tradeoff between (i) innovation gains (which tend to demand
more property); and (ii) transaction costs plus associated innovation losses
(which tend to demand less), the practical implementation of which is in turn
influenced by propertization biases and coordination cost conditions among
dominant innovator populations. More specifically: this model anticipates that
(i) any idiosyncratic lobbying or enforcement action will inherently tend to
elicit excessive propertization whereby transaction costs (and resulting
innovation losses) overrun innovation gains, which, barring sufficiently high
coordination costs or a sufficiently skewed propertization bias, will then
inherently be followed by (ii) truncation actions by adversely affected
innovator populations that apply lobbying pressures or, of greater practical
interest, form transactional structures to move toward a weaker propertization
outcome. In the following case study, I will first assess the extent to which this
idealized model of regime evolution tracks the actual evolution of intellectual
property rights over approximately six decades in the U.S. semiconductor
market.
B. Case Study: Regime Selection in the Semiconductor Industry
The semiconductor market, 49 which dates its inception from the invention
of the transistor in 1947 (or alternatively, the subsequent invention of the
integrated circuit in 1961), is a field of obviously paramount importance (2007
(arguing that intellectual property evolution tends to follow a three-stage path consisting of
disequilibrium induced by a technological development, case law adaptation, and legislative
consolidation of an emerging consensus). For a variant of the "pendulum" view applied to
industrial design protection, see J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign
Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J.
1143, which argues that design protection follows a circular pattern where expanded
copyright protection for industrial art elicits pressures in the general product market to
contract copyright protection, which then elicits pressures to expand legal protections for
industrial art.
149. As used herein (and following standard usage), "semiconductors market" refers to the
market for integrated circuits (also known as a "chip" or "device"), which in turn generally
fall into the three major categories of (i) memory components; (ii) logic devices; and (iii)
integrated circuits (including microprocessors used in PCs) made of components that
combine categories (i) and (ii). See Semiconductors and Related Devices, in i ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRIES 1o85, io86 (Lynn M. Pearce ed., 4 th ed. 2005). Broader definitions of
the market would include semiconductor equipment and materials. For a detailed review of
the market, see INTEGRATED CIRCUIT ENGINEERING CORPORATION, STATUS 1997: A REPORT
ON THE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT INDUSTRY (Bill McClean ed., 1997).
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worldwide revenues of $275.5 billion' °) in modern economies based on the
ubiquitous use of electronic components. Roughly following the generic
template sketched above, this historical case study begins in a sharing regime
that supports a collective innovation pool largely bereft of robust
propertization, then experiences substantially increasing adoption and
enforcement of intellectual property rights, and then backtracks to a hybrid
regime where cooperative arrangements are embedded within a property
regime. As I shall now examine in greater detail, the hybrid structure under
which semiconductor firms currently operate is the result of an ongoing
calibration process that can be understood in terms of three primary
movements along a regime path moving between greater and lesser
propertization, which is driven both by idiosyncratic actions that activate
formally available property rights and self-correction efforts to minimize the
transaction cost burdens associated with a robust property regime.
1. Property at Bay (c. 1956-1982)
The first stage coincides with the industry's early years of technological
development, during which time the U.S. semiconductor industry effectively
operated under a sharing regime where basic technologies were widely
disseminated. Observers widely report that firms typically did not place great
value on patent protection and devoted limited resources to obtaining and
defending patents, 5 ' for the most part tolerating reverse engineering and
relying on lead time and trade secrecy protections in order to secure returns." 2
This cooperative convention was rooted historically in two major actions. First,
a collective innovation pool was generated through open licensing practices at
IBM and AT&T, l"3 which predated the 1956 antitrust consent decrees that
made these mandatory, and are credited with instituting an industry
convention of cross-licensing among domestic firms at below-market royalty
15o. See Global Semiconductor Alliance, Industry Data, http://www.gsaglobal.org/resources/
industrydata/facts.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
151. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 60, at 57. For similar observations, see DAVID P. ANGEL,
RESTRUCTURING FOR INNOVATION: THE REMAKING OF THE U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
38-43 (1994); CHRISTOPHE LECUYER, MAKING SILICON VALLEY: INNOVATION AND THE
GROWTH OF HIGH TECH, 1930-1970, at 253-94 (2006).
152. See Levin, Semiconductor Industry, supra note 116, at 82; Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne
Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1597 (2002).
153. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. It is commonly stated that the consent decrees
were the "but for" reason for these "open licensing" practices. As Richard Levin shows in
detail, this is arguably not the case given that these practices predated the decree and Bell
Labs exceeded the decree's requirements thereafter. See Levin, supra note 116, at 76-78.
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rates.' 4 Second, to protect against supply disruptions, buyers customarily
insisted that any supplier designate a "second source" supplier to cover any
production shortfall, which in turn necessitated sharing process and product
technology with a competitor. ' Given the fundamental technological
breakthroughs achieved during this period, it is hard to argue that this sharing
regime did not provide a sustainable regime for innovation investment under
then existing market conditions.
2. Property Unleashed (c. 1982-1988)
The second stage starts with a "demand shock" and "supply shock" to the
sharing regime that had previously governed the semiconductor market: in
respective order, this refers to the growth of the consumer electronics market
and the market penetration achieved in the early 198os by lower cost firms
from Japan, which halved U.S. firms' share of the worldwide market in less
than ten years.,, 6 U.S. firms' loss of market share to Japanese firms, who drew
on but (following standard accounts) made little contribution to the existing
innovation pool,"1 7 strained the appropriation capacities of the sharing regime
that had theretofore governed the industry. These pressures ultimately resulted
in abandonment of the sharing regime in two separate actions. First, in 1984,
154. See ANGEL, supra note 151, at 38-39; TEECE, supra note 1o8, at 199-201. On historically
below-market royalty rates, see Andrew Pollack, A Chip Maker's Profit on Patents, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 199o, at Di.
155. See Andy Grove, Churning Things Up, FORTUNE, Aug. 11, 2003, at 115. This policy was
complemented by the fact that the military funded R&D contracts with private firms, who
were then required to disseminate publicly some technical findings. See Levin, Semiconductor
Industry, supra note 116, at 66-82.
156. Japanese (and later, Korean and Taiwanese) firms pushed U.S. firms' share of the
worldwide semiconductor market from approximately 56.7% in 1982 to 42.6% in 1992 and
48.3% in 2005. See SEMICONDUCTOR INDUS. ASS'N, STATS: WORLD MARKET SALES
& SRARES-1982-2005 (2oo6), http://www.sia-online.org/galleries/press-release-files/
shares.pdf.
157. At the time, U.S. manufacturers claimed that Japanese firms copied the circuitry layout of
U.S.-developed chips, which was not subject to intellectual property protections. See Leon
Radomsky, Sixteen Years After the Passage of the U.S. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: Is
International Protection Working?, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1049, 1051-52 (2000). Some
commentators attribute Japanese success principally to superior, lower-cost production
methods, with little importance placed on imitation of existing technology. See ANGEL, supra




U.S. firms successfully lobbied for the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act s8
(SCPA), which provides sui generis protection for the "mask work" (that is,
the circuitry layout design) of a semiconductor chip. The statute uniquely
authorizes reverse engineering for purposes of creating a new mask work,5 9 a
feature that is consistent with an attempt to preserve low-cost sharing practices
within a surrounding property regime.i 6° The second action, however, is more
suspect. In 1985, Texas Instruments (TI) 6 1 defected from the industry's low
enforcement norm-at the time, to the loudly expressed chagrin of its
competitors 62- by bringing patent infringement suits against Japanese firms,
and then subsequently demanding increased royalties from domestic licensees,
often based on patents that TI had held since the early 1970s but, consistent
with the then prevailing low enforcement convention, had not previously
asserted. 6, Prominent firms such as IBM, Motorola, and AT&T-all of which
had once been firm advocates for weak intellectual property rights in the
semiconductors market-followed TI's defection, exploiting the newly
activated property regime to push royalty rates on chips above historically
158. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, tit. III, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 901-914 (2006)).
159. 17 U.S.C. § 9o6(a). This exception permits reproduction of a protected mask work for
purposes of "evaluating the concepts or techniques embodies in the mask work" and then
incorporating the results of such analysis into a new mask work, which then in turn qualifies
for protection assuming it meets the statutory originality requirement. Id.
16o. For a description of reverse engineering practices at this time in the industry, see Levin,
Semiconductor Industry, supra note 116, at 80-82. As a practical matter, the statute has become
an underused "dead letter," largely due to certain technological advances that have
frustrated third-party imitation that relies solely on reverse engineering the layout design.
See Radomsky, supra note 157, at 1077-82. Others argue that it retains some residual function
in facilitating licensing of "IP blocks" among "design only" firms in the industry. See Jeffrey
T. Macher, David C. Mowery & David A. Hodges, Reversal of Fortune? The Recovery of the
U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 107, 127 (1998).
161. See Lawrence M. Fisher, Patents: Aggressive Defender Branches Out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1992,
at L38.
162. See Pollack, supra note 154 (noting that, as result of litigation, Texas Instruments was
considered the "schoolyard bully of the electronics industry"); see also Peter C. Grindley &
David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Captial: Licensing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors
and Electronics, in ESSAYS IN TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 204,213 (David J. Teece
ed., 2003) (noting "outrage" in industry to TI's aggressive litigation strategy, in deviation
from industry norms).
163. See Bronwyn H. Hall, Exploring the Patent Explosion, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EDWIN
MANSFIELD: THE ECONOMICS OF R&D, INNOVATION, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, 195,
201-02 (Albert N. Link & F.M. Scherer eds., 2005); Pollack, supra note 154, at D19.
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below-market levels, 64 which subsequently led the entire market into active
deployment of patent protections. This result is consistent with the property
trap model: absent coordination, perceived litigation risk and associated costs
trigger rapid propertization -even by firms that had previously opposed it-
following even a single defection from the existing cooperative norm.
3. Property Constrained (c. 1988-present)
The third stage is characterized by two contradictory developments. First,
propertization has been accelerated throughout the market: the "TI strategy"
became the industry norm as patenting rates increased dramatically among all
semiconductor firms,' 6 5 even exceeding the overall increase in U.S. patenting
during the same period.166 Small design-based firms in particular have made
extensive efforts to adopt and enforce patent rights, 6 ' including both "fabless"
firms that lack any independent fabrication capacity 68 and "chipless" firms
that provide modular components (known as "IP blocks" or "cores") for
164. See Macher et al., supra note 16o, at 128; Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis & Bronwyn H. Hall, The
Effects of Strengthening Patent Rights on Firms Engaged in Cumulative Innovation: Insights from
the Semiconductor Industry, in 13 ENTREPRENEURIAL INPUTS AND OUTCOMES: NEW STUDIES OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 133, 144-45 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2001).
165. Adjusted relative to R&D dollars, this rate (that is, the propensity to patent) doubled between
1982 and 1992. See Ziedonis & Hall, supra note 164, at 144-45.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 137, 159 (finding that firms that entered the semiconductor industry after 1982
patent more intensively than pre-1982 entrants, where 1982 is used as a "marker" for
strengthened patent rights based on creation of Federal Circuit; in particular, finding that
small firms are five times more likely to patent than all other firms in the sample, which
excludes, however, some of the largest diversified semiconductor manufacturers); Adam B.
Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29
RES. POL'Y 531, 540 (2000) (stating that semiconductor patents held by small "design" firms
are disproportionately the subject of patent litigation); Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Patent
Litigation in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY 181-82 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (finding that large
vertically integrated semiconductor firms tend to cross-license patents while small design
firms tend to adopt more litigious strategies).
168. See Ziedonis & Hall, supra note 164, at 142-43. "Fabless" firms now constitute roughly
twenty percent of the worldwide semiconductor chip market. See Global Semiconductor
Alliance, http://www.gsaglobal.org (last visited Sept. 5, 2009). For further discussion of the
fabless sector and its reliance on patent rights, see Raj Attia, Isabelle Davy & Roland
Rizoulires, Innovative Labor and Intellectual Property Market in the Semiconductor Industry, in
TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETS FOR KNOWLEDGE: KNOWLEDGE CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND
EXCHANGE WITHIN A GROWING ECONOMY 137 (Bernard Guilhon ed., 2001).
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assembly into complex integrated circuit products.!6" Second, formal
propertization has been simultaneously limited by efforts undertaken by large
firm incumbents, consisting of: (i) constrained enforcement of patent rights
against other large firm competitors (who have not initiated more patent
litigation since the early 198os, controlling for increases in the number of
patents held and/or amount of R&D spending);7' and (ii) multiple industry-
level and firm-level cooperative ventures, covering a wide variety of research
consortia, strategic alliances,'17' and broad "field of use" cross-licensing
agreements among holders of similarly valued patent portfolios, which often
set royalty payments at low or nominal levels consistent with the underlying
objective of ensuring reciprocal access.' 72 At the industry level there exist
several large-scale ventures of substantial magnitude, including: (i) the
Semiconductor Industry Association (the "SIA"), founded in 1977 by leading
firms as the industry's trade association; 173 (ii) through SIA and cognate
associations in other countries, the International Semiconductor Technology
Roadmap for Semiconductors, a trade group that sets technological milestones
that guide R&D investment by member firms;' 74 and (iii) several international
standard-setting consortia that are vital to the development of the market in
169. See Attia et al., supra note 168, at 165-67.
170. See Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, An Empirical Analysis of Patent
Litigation in the Semiconductor Industry 14-16 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author); see also Allison et al., supra note 1n5, at 446, 472 (noting that patents in the
seminconductor industry are less likely to be litigated than those in other industries);
Allison et al., supra note 138, at 25-27 (finding that semiconductor patents are a minor
percentage of two datasets, which consisted of one dataset consisting of every patent that
has been litigated eight times or more during 2000-2007 and one randomly selected control
set of patents that had been litigated once during that same period).
171. See ANGEL, supra note 151, at 3, 85-86; Macher et al., supra note 16o, at 120.
172. See TEECE, supra note io8, at app. A; John H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with
Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios, 69 ANTITRUST L. J. 851 (2OOl); Grindley & Teece, supra
note 162; see also Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox
Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32
RAND J. ECON. 101, 125 (2001) (finding that large firms appear to expand patent portfolios
largely for the defensive purpose of preventing holdup or infringement claims by rivals
holding potentially overlapping patents); Moore, supra note 27, at 1544-45 (finding that
semiconductor patents show high renewal rates based on all patents issued in 1991, but
noting that based on other results, semiconductor patents are infrequently litigated relative
to other industries, and concluding that these findings together suggest that semiconductor
patents are primarily used as trading currency for cross-licensing purposes).
173. See Semiconductor Industry Association, Industry Fact Sheet, http://www.sia-
online.org/cs/industry-resources/industry-fact sheet (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
174. See International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors, http://www.itrs.net (last
visited Sept. 5, 2009).
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"IP modules" that are sold as intermediate inputs to fabless firms and
integrated manufacturers.17 ' Technology sharing is most expressly
implemented in SEMATECH, 176 a unique institution in U.S. industrial policy
that was founded in 1988 by thirteen firms (with assistance from the federal
government) then representing eighty percent of the U.S. semiconductor chip
market and now includes domestic and foreign members representing fifty
percent of the worldwide semiconductor chip market. 77 This cooperative
arrangement has facilitated the improvement of semiconductor-manufacturing
technology and coordination of industry technological standards through
internal R&D programs and funding of external R&D programs at private
firms, the results of which are then disseminated to SEMATECH members in
rough conformity with a knowledge sharing model. 178
175. For further information, see ASHISH ARORA, ANDREA FOSFURI & ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA,
MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
257-58 (2001); and Attia et al., supra note 168, at 164-65.
176. For discussions of this organization, see LARRY D. BROWNING & JUDY C. SHETLER,
SEMATECH: SAVING THE U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY (2000); Larry D. Browning,
Janice M. Beyer & Judy C. Shetier, Building Cooperation in a Competitive Industry:
SEMATECH and the Semiconductor Industry, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 113 (1995); and Rose Marie
Ham, Greg Linden & Melissa M. Appleyard, The Evolving Role of Semiconductor Consortia in
the United States and Japan, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 137 (1998).
1T7. See SEMATECH INC., 2007-A YEAR IN REVIEW 3 (20o8), http://www.sematech.org/
corporate/annual/annualo7.pdf. Contributions from 1987-1996 consisted of $85o million in
dues from members and a matching amount in federal funding. See Ham et al., supra note
176, at 149. Federal funding ceased in 1996. Id. Note that smaller firms generally do not
participate in SEMATECH due to its capped fixed-fee schedule (one percent of annual
revenues, subject to a minimum of one million dollars and a maximum of fifteen million
dollars), which yields amounts that may be manageable in absolute terms for an industry
leader but exorbitant for a small entrant. See Douglas A. Irwin & Peter J. Klenow, Sematech:
Purpose and Performance, 93 NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. USA 12,739, 12,740 (1996).
118. See BROWNING& SHETLER, supra note 176, at 107-o8; Ham et al., supra note 176, at 143-44. A
General Accounting Office report notes that consortium members state that SEMATECH
has successfully shifted the industry from a "competitive, arms-length relationship between
semiconductor manufacturers and their suppliers toward a culture that establishes long-
term relationships between semiconductor manufacturers and their suppliers." U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL RESEARCH: SEMATECH's TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND
PROPOSED R&D PROGRAM 8 (1992), http://archive.gao.gov/d33tlO/147343.pdf. Other
observers are less sanguine concerning the performance of SEMATECH, arguing that it
failed to achieve its objectives of improving industry profitability, generated few new
innovations, and abandoned its cooperative research mission for "bail-out" investments in
distressed equipment manufacturers. See DICK, supra note 157, at 65-70.
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4. End Result: Regime Bifurcation
The semiconductor industry illustrates a hybrid innovation regime
generated by a multidecade process of moving up and down the regime path
between lesser and greater levels of propertization, each of which achieves
some tradeoff between innovation gains and transaction cost losses. Figure 9
below provides a graphical overview of this mixed regime landscape, where (i)
an actively deployed innovation regime, employed to the fullest extent by
small-firm entrants and to a partial extent by large-firm incumbents, is
infiltrated at multiple points by (ii) firm-level and industry-level cooperative
mechanisms, used primarily by large-firm vertically integrated incumbents
with similarly sized innovation portfolios. The analytical payoff from a
bottom-up approach to understanding propertization processes in innovation
markets should be apparent: the substantial complexity-or "regime
diversity" -relative to the standard commons/property dichotomy is striking.
On the one hand, widespread adoption and aggressive use of the formal
property rights regime (mostly, but not always, by smaller firms) is indicative
of a property regime, which is sometimes afflicted by arduous patent
litigations. Exhibit A for this unwelcome side effect is the Dickensian litigation
currently being pursued by Rambus, a semiconductor firm that is pursuing
suits against several firms for infringement of patents that purportedly cover
technologies adopted by an industry standard-setting consortium. '79 On the
other hand, the transaction cost burdens attendant to a formal property regime
are ameliorated by constrained patent enforcement among large-firm
enterprises, cross-licensing arrangements, and an impressive variety of
industry-level cooperative institutions, as a result of which mostly larger firms
share valuable knowledge with similarly situated competitors.
179. There is no single history of the complex and multiple litigations pursued by Rambus
against most of the leading integrated chip manufacturers (and the various countersuits
filed in response). For a summary overview, see Rambus-Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rambus (last visited Sept. 5, 2009). For all motions, filings,
and orders in the various proceedings, see Rambus Litigation Update,
http://investor.rambus.comlitigation.cfm?CategorylD=779 (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
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Figure 9.
REGIME DIVERSITY IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
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18o. Note that, for presentation purposes, this Figure does not illustrate (i) "involuntary"
knowledge spillovers to small-firm nonmembers from some cooperative ventures funded by
large-firm members, and (ii) the use by some vertically integrated manufacturers of
"foundries" for manufacturing capacity and "chipless" firms as sources of design
components. For more detailed discussion of the latter phenomenon, see Attia et al., supra









Through this bifurcated structure (which can be described as a potential
overpropertization outcome adjusted by corrective truncation actions), the low
transaction cost environment that initially characterized the industry partially
persists to the present day among incumbent firms despite stark changes in the
total resources the industry allocates to the adoption and enforcement of
formal intellectual property rights. Hence, despite operating under the burden
of tens of thousands of patents and periodic patent litigations, it can fairly be
argued that the industry has substantially (but certainly not entirely) escaped
the property trap that could stifle product development beneath transaction
cost burdens. Following the too much property thesis and its related variants,
this is an inherently surprising achievement given that multiple overlapping
property rights and extraordinarily high capital investments would appear to
make the semiconductor market an especially strong candidate for falling prey
to a patent thicket that stifles innovative output. Following a process-based
approach, however, this surprising result is largely predictable: the rational
incentives of large resource holders in maximizing the cumulative stream of net
innovation returns, together with inherently low obstacles to mutually
beneficial. coordination in concentrated markets, generate cooperative
structures that relieve transaction cost burdens that might otherwise endanger
innovative output.
CONCLUSION
This Article offers a process-based approach to understanding
propertization processes in innovation markets: namely, the expansion and
contraction of intellectual property rights is viewed predominately as a
function of private market investments in lobbying, adoption, and enforcement
actions as well as a wide range of transactional and organizational
arrangements for distributing and exchanging intellectual assets. Application
of this bottom-up framework confirms the standard view that individually
rational pursuit of economic rents can yield collectively irrational levels of
intellectual property coverage: rational expectations of infringement liability
and resource bottlenecks drive mutually destructive overconsumption of
intellectual property rights. But a process-based approach makes the critical
observation that this overpropertization outcome is contingent upon the
satisfaction of certain predicate conditions, which implies that it will
sometimes be subject to modification or reversal. Where adversely affected
firms face low coordination costs (which is most likely to characterize
concentrated or well-organized economic interests) and are neither clearly net
users nor net producers of intellectual resources (which is most likely to
characterize large firms in cumulative-innovation industries), then
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overpropertization is likely to be alleviated by lobbying actions or, more
typically, a wide range of voluntarily formed sharing arrangements or even
forfeitures of intellectual assets. Conversely, where these conditions are not
substantially satisfied, then the pathological result is likely to be realized. This
cautiously optimistic view of propertization processes relies on a reasoned
application of private interest in service of the public interest: subject to
coordination costs and propertization biases, transaction cost inefficiencies
generated by overpropertization induce political, transactional, and
organizational entrepreneurship to accrue the gains from correcting it. To be
sure, this proposition is far from a comprehensive account of regime selection
in innovation markets: it is well known that political markets are "noisy" and
further inquiry will demand elucidation of the complex interaction between
demand-side and supply side dynamics in the aggregate determination of
propertization outcomes. It can nonetheless be observed that there exists some
meaningful range of circumstances where the most influential market
participants are likely to have socially compatible incentives and capacities to
correct the transaction cost burdens and associated losses that arise from
overpropertization outcomes. And if that is the case, then widespread but
inherently uncertain claims that innovation markets chronically suffer from too
much property are presumptively vulnerable for a simple reason: sometimes,
the market will not stand for it.
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